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THE PERSISTENCE OF UNION REPRESSION IN AN 
ERA OF RECOGNITION 
Anne Marie Lofaso* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Labor rights in countries with predominantly free market economies have 
generally passed through three stages—repression, tolerance, and recognition.1  In 
the United States, nineteenth-century state and federal governments repressed labor 
unions by making conduct, such as workers banding together for higher wages, 
subject to criminal penalty and civil liability.2  Courts paved the way for tolerating 
labor unions by overruling repressive precedents.3  By the early twentieth century, 
Congress followed suit by legislatively exempting unions from certain legal 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law.  The American Constitution 
Society for Law and Policy originally distributed a much shorter version of this Article electronically 
under the title, September Massacre: The Latest Battle in the War on Workers’ Rights Under the 
National Labor Relations Act.  I wish to thank Luke Boso, Ellen Dannin, Praveen Fernandes, Michael 
Gooen, Jim Heiko, and Jeff Hirsch for their invaluable comments on September Massacre.  I am also 
grateful for the research assistance of Steven Grubbs, Christopher John Williamson, and Matthew T. 
Yanni on a later version of this Article.  Special thanks to Professor Bob Bastress, Professor Michael 
Risch, and Vince Trivelli for enduring several conversations with me on this topic, to Professor Dale 
Olson for encouraging me to expand September Massacre into this Article, to the West Virginia 
University Law Faculty for their comments on an earlier version of this paper that I presented at a 
faculty colloquium, and to the Hodges Foundation for its support of this project.  All views and errors 
are the Author’s.  This Article is dedicated to the late C. Edwin Baker (1947-2009), my teacher, my 
mentor, and my friend. 
 1. See Antoine Jacobs, Collective Self Regulation, in THE MAKING OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE:  A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NINE COUNTRIES UP TO 1945 (Bob Hepple ed. 1986).  Notably, the United 
Kingdom, which has passed through all three stages, seems to oscillate between the tolerance and 
recognition stages.  See Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47 (Eng.) (ushering in the era of union 
tolerance); Industrial Relations Act, 1971, 19 & 20 Eliz. 2, c. 72, §§ 27-32, 34-43, 65 (Eng.) (shifting to 
a recognition model), repealed by Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, 22 & 23 Eliz. 2, c. 52 
(Eng.) (returning to a tolerance model); Employment Relations Act, 1999, c. 26, § 23 (shifting back to a 
recognition model). See generally Nancy Peters, The United Kingdom Recalibrates the U.S. National 
Labor Relations Act:  Possible Lessons for the United States?, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 227 (2004).  
British scholars have disagreed as to which stage actually protects workers rights more 
comprehensively, a debate I touch upon in the conclusion of this Article. 
 2. For example, state courts often repressed union activity by upholding indictments for criminal 
conspiracy against workers who banned together for some benefit.  See, e.g., People v. Melvin, 2 
Wheeler Crim. Cas. 262 (N.Y. 1810) (holding that trade unions are criminal conspiracies designed for 
the illegal purpose of raising the wages of their members).  Employers also brought civil actions against 
unions for damages arising from early union activity.  These actions often resulted in injunctive relief.  
See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896) (enjoining striking employees from 
patrolling the sidewalk in front of their employer’s business in an effort to deter the hiring of 
replacement workers).  
 3. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (Mass. 1842). Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Pullis (The Philadelphia Cordwainers Case) (Phila. Mayor’s Ct. 1806), reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59 (John R. Commons et al. eds., 1958) (providing an 
example of a repressive precedent, namely that membership in a union constituted criminal conspiracy 
to illegally raise wages).  See also Walter Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165 
(1931). 
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liabilities.4  In 1935, Congress enacted Section 7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA), marking the first formal federal government recognition of 
employees’ “right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.”5  Technically, we are currently in an era of 
recognition. 
After examining the NLRA’s seventy-five-year history, however, it is at least 
debatable whether labor rights in the United States have diverged from the 
repression-tolerance-recognition pattern. Notwithstanding the fundamentally 
progressive nature of Section 7, the protective power of the original NLRA, as 
enacted in 1935 (popularly called “the Wagner Act”), has been eroded by 
congressional amendments, coupled with successive interpretations of the courts 
and the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter “the NLRB” or “the 
Board”)—the very agency tasked by Congress with protecting workers’ rights.6  By 
weakening the NLRA’s protective power, all three branches of the government 
have legally and economically disempowered unions and thus weakened their 
capacity to protect the working class.7 
This Article focuses on several of the sixty-one decisions issued by the 
NLRB’s five-member Board in September 2007 as well as a few of its other more 
controversial decisions.8  The labor community has come to regard the Board’s 
September 2007 decisions as the “September Massacre.”9  The term “massacre” 
                                                                                                     
 4. In 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act, which exempted organized labor from antitrust 
laws.  15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).  In 1932, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which removed 
federal courts’ jurisdiction and authority to grant restraining orders or temporary or permanent 
injunctions in any “case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,” except as otherwise provided by 
the act.  29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).  Indeed, the Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the 
NLRA, went so far as to characterize the rights granted under Section 7 as “fundamental.”  NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).  The NLRA also marked formal recognition of the 
right to strike.  29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006). 
 6. Many scholars have made this observation.  See, e.g., ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE 
WORKERS’ LAW:  HOW TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS (2006); JAMES B. ATLESON, 
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 4-5 (1983); Karl E. Klare, Judicial 
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 
MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). 
 7. My claim—that weakening labor law’s protective power over the working class weakens the 
union’s capacity to protect the working class—does not imply that this is the only avenue that unions 
have for protecting the working class.  Indeed, diluting the NLRA clarifies the need for other paths, such 
as integrating workplace organizations and community organizations into a “workplace-community.”  
See BILL FLETCHER JR. & FERNANDO GAPASIN, SOLIDARITY DIVIDED:  THE CRISIS IN ORGANIZED 
LABOR AND A NEW PATH TOWARD SOCIAL JUSTICE 174 (2008).  Accordingly, I agree with Fletcher and 
Gapasin’s observation that “if class struggle is not restricted to the workplace, then neither should 
unions be.”  Id. 
 8. In September 2007, the Board was comprised of five members: three Republicans (Chairman 
Robert J. Battista and Members Peter C. Schaumber and Peter N. Kirsanow) and two Democrats (Wilma 
B. Liebman and Dennis P. Walsh). 
 9. I first heard the term “September Massacre” applied to the Board’s September 2007 decisions at 
the ABA Labor and Employment Law meeting in Philadelphia on November 8, 2007.  During the panel, 
“A Dialogue with the National Labor Relations Board,” former Board member Sarah M. Fox vigorously 
defended labor’s use of that term. 
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suggests an indiscriminate and instantaneous destruction of a large number of 
longstanding labor doctrines.  But, on closer scrutiny, it becomes clear that many of 
the September decisions fit into a long history of legislative, administrative, and 
judicial cutbacks to the original NLRA.   
The September Massacre, then, is more accurately viewed as the latest, and 
perhaps most serious, attack on workers’ rights—this time by a Board controlled by 
appointees of President George W. Bush (hereinafter “the Bush II Board”).10  The 
characterization of the September decisions as a “massacre” is arguably accurate 
for two reasons.  First, in many instances, the Bush II Board’s September 2007 
decisions cumulatively chip away at the NLRA’s protections more vigorously than 
decisions from previous administrations.  Second, while historically the courts and 
Congress have been responsible for much of the NLRA’s erosion, the September 
Massacre was wrought by the very administrative agency charged with protecting 
Section 7 rights, including the fundamental right of working people to band 
together collectively for mutual aid and protection.     
Section II of this Article discusses the aggregate, weakening effect on the 
NLRA by the Bush II Board and prior governmental action.  This aggregate 
weakening effect is demonstrated by focusing on four topics:  (1) the narrowing 
statutory definition of employee; (2) the shrinking scope of NLRA Section 7; (3) 
the dilution of economic weapons; and (4) the rejection of some lawful remedies.  
Section III of this Article illustrates the damaging role that adjudicative delay has 
had on the Board’s power to administer industrial justice.  Section IV of this 
Article examines one of the most prominent—and perhaps most damaging—of the 
September 2007 decisions, Dana Corp.  Section V of this Article concludes with 
some remarks on what the labor movement can do to regain economic and political 
power. 
II.  THE SEPTEMBER MASSACRE DECISIONS CONSTITUTE PART OF A HALF-CENTURY 
TREND THAT WEAKENS THE NLRA11 
A. Overview 
This Section examines how all three branches of government—Congress, the 
executive branch through the NLRB, and the courts, particularly the Supreme 
Court—have weakened the NLRA over time.  It focuses primarily on those Bush II 
Board decisions that have chipped away at the fundamental right of working class 
members to “self-organiz[e],” to “bargain collectively,” and to band together for 
                                                                                                     
 10. In September Massacre, see supra note *, I defined the George W. Bush-appointed Board as the 
Bush Board, but I like much better the nomenclature, Bush II Board, adopted by others.  See, e.g., 
Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile:  Problems with Its 
Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2018 n.22 (2009); David L. 
Gregory, Unsafe Workplaces, Injured Employees, and the Bizarre Bifurcation of Section 7 of the 
National Labor Relations Act, 111 W.VA. L. REV. 395, 407 (2009); William B. Gould IV, The 
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken 
System of Labor-Management Relations Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 308 (2008). 
 11. See generally Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of 
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).   
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“mutual aid or protection.”12  And it places these cases in the context of larger 
trends among the other branches that have disempowered workers by narrowing the 
definition of employee, limiting the scope of Section 7’s protective cover, diluting 
employees’ economic weapons, and weakening the Board’s remedial framework.   
The substantive content of these four areas of labor law are of intense interest 
to workers for several reasons.  As a threshold matter, the question whether any 
particular worker is an employee under NLRA Section 2(3)13 is a jurisdictional 
question; the NLRA simply does not apply to those workers who do not meet the 
statutory definition of employee.14  Consequently, as the Board narrows the 
definition of employee, the NLRA protects fewer members of the working class 
because the Board will refuse to consider complaints from those workers whom the 
Board has read out of the statute.15  I call this phenomenon the vanishing 
employee.16 
Even if a particular worker meets the statutory definition of employee, the 
NLRA’s protection is only as good as the breadth of those activities that are 
covered.  In this Section, I focus on three labor doctrines to show how the Bush II 
Board has limited the NLRA’s protective cover.  First, I show how the Supreme 
Court’s Babcock/Lechmere17 line of cases coupled with the Bush II Board’s recent 
assault on paid union organizers curtails employees’ fundamental right to self-
organization.  Second, I discuss the ramifications of the Bush II Board’s recent 
attempt in Register Guard18 to further curtail self-organization by cutting off 
employee access to e-mail as a source of workplace communication.  Third, I show 
how the Bush II Board’s reversal of the court-approved Board precedent extending 
Weingarten rights19 to nonunion employees is destructive of employees’ right to 
mutual aid or protection. 
Another way to weaken the ability of unions to protect members of the 
working class is to take away economic weapons available to unions, thereby 
diluting their economic power.  Historically, the eradication of economic weapons 
was accomplished primarily by congressional amendment to the NLRA.  But the 
Bush II Board has played some role in further chipping away at those economic 
                                                                                                     
 12. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
 13. Id. § 152(3) (2006).   
 14. For example, in FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, where the Court concluded that the Board 
incorrectly determined that the FedEx single-route drivers were “employees” within the meaning of 
NLRA Section 2(3), the Court held that FedEx did not commit an unfair labor practice when it refused 
to bargain with those employees’ labor representative.  563 F.3d 492, 495, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  Had 
the Court upheld the Board’s conclusion that the drivers were statutory employees, the Court also would 
have upheld the Board’s conclusion that FedEx, which admittedly refused to bargain with the union, had 
violated the NLRA.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Igramo Enter., Inc., 310 F. App’x 452, 453-54 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(upholding the Board’s finding that workers were statutory employees and therefore upholding the 
Board’s finding that a company violated the NLRA when it admittedly threatened those workers for 
demanding higher wages and for engaging in other protected conduct). 
 15. See, e.g., Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490-93 (2004). 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 
(1992). 
 18. 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), review granted in pertinent part, Guard Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 571 
F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 19. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text. 
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weapons.  This Section ends with an examination of the extent to which the Bush II 
Board has chosen not to exercise its full remedial authority to remedy employer 
unfair labor practices.   
B.  The Vanishing Employee20 
1.  The NLRB’s Jurisdiction over All Cases Affecting Commerce, All Employers, 
All Employees, and All Unions Unless Otherwise Exempted from Coverage 
The NLRA grants the Board jurisdiction over all cases “affecting 
commerce.”21  In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,22 the main case holding 
the NLRA constitutional,23 the Supreme Court declared the Board’s jurisdiction to 
be coextensive with the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.24  The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently explained that, “in passing the 
National Labor Relations Act, Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the 
fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce 
Clause.”25   
This grant of jurisdiction is limited by three statutory definitions:  employer,26 
employee,27 and labor organization (i.e., unions).28  With regard to the statutory 
definition of employer, the Board has imposed discretionary guidelines for 
                                                                                                     
 20. I am currently developing an article by this title examining in greater detail the legal 
phenomenon of the vanishing employee.  This section of the Article merely focuses on a few Bush II 
Board decisions to illustrate the phenomenon. 
 21. “The Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . 
. . affecting commerce.”  29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2006) (emphasis added).  “Whenever a petition [regarding 
representation] shall have been filed . . . the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable 
cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an 
appropriate hearing upon due notice.”  29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).  The statute 
defines “affecting commerce” as “in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow 
of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or 
the free flow of commerce.”  29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (2006). 
 22. 301 U.S. 1. 
 23. Id. at 25-26, 49 (holding the NLRA constitutional as applied to the fourth largest producer of 
steel in the United States, which was engaged in the manufacture and distribution of iron and steel).  See 
also NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 53-54, 57 (1937) (holding the NLRA constitutional as 
applied to a company engaged in the manufacture, assembly, sale, and distribution of commercial 
trailers, trailer parts, and accessories in twelve different states); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks 
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 72, 75 (1937) (holding the NLRA constitutional as applied to a Virginia 
corporation “engaged in the purchase of raw materials and the manufacture, sale and distribution of 
men’s clothing” where 99.57% of the materials involved were purchased outside Virginia and where 
82.8% of the garments manufactured were sold to customers outside Virginia). 
 24. 301 U.S. at 31-32 (explaining that “acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate or foreign 
commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of congressional power.  Acts having that effect are not 
rendered immune because they grow out of labor disputes. . . .  It is the effect upon commerce, not the 
source of the injury, which is the criterion.”).   
 25. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (emphasis in original) (citing Guss 
v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 3 (1957); Polish Nat’l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 647 
(1944); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939)).  
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006). 
 27. Id. § 152(3) (2006). 
 28. Id. § 152(5) (2006).  The scope of this definition is not discussed in this Article. 
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asserting jurisdiction that are tantamount to declining to assert jurisdiction over 
some entities that would otherwise meet the statutory definition of employer; in 
particular, the Board generally will not assert jurisdiction over retail establishments 
that gross less than $500,000 in annual gross volume29 or over nonretail 
establishments, such as manufacturers, with less than $50,000 annual outflow or 
inflow.30   
Although the Supreme Court has never reviewed the reasonableness of the 
Board’s policy of declining to assert jurisdiction over a particular statutory 
employer in these limited circumstances, in Office Employees International Union, 
Local No. 11 v. NLRB,31 the Court did strike down the Board’s policy of declining 
to assert jurisdiction over an entire subclass of employers, such as a union when 
“acting as an employer.”32  There, the Court asserted two reasons that the Board’s 
“arbitrary blanket exclusion of union employers as a class [was] beyond the power 
of the Board.”33  First, the Court observed that the Board’s blanket exclusion was 
contrary to the NLRA’s plain language, which defines employer as “any person 
acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include . . . 
any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer).”34  The Court 
then pointed out that, while the Board may “sometimes properly decline[] to (assert 
jurisdiction) stating that the policies of the Act would not be effectuated by its 
assertion of jurisdiction in that case,”35 here “the Board renounces jurisdiction over 
an entire category of employers, i.e., labor unions, a most important segment of 
American industrial life.”36 
2.  The Bush II Board Decisions Read Certain Subclasses of Employees out of the 
NLRA—Salts, Students, and the Severely Disabled 
At issue here is the statutory definition of employee.  NLRA Section 2(3) 
defines employee as “any employee.”37  The Supreme Court has characterized the 
statutory definition of “employee” as very “broad,”38 although the circular nature of 
the statutory definition leaves some room for interpretation.  Under Chevron, 
                                                                                                     
 29. Carolina Supplies and Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 88, 88-89 (1958) (announcing policy). See 
also NLRB v. Pizza Pizzaz, Inc., 646 F.2d 706, 707 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Erlich’s 814, Inc., 577 
F.2d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 30. Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81, 85 (1958) (announcing the policy and declaring that 
the Board “will adhere to its past practice of adding direct and indirect outflow, or direct and indirect 
inflow,” but “will not add outflow and inflow”).  See also NLRB v. Somerville Constr. Co., 206 F.3d 
752, 754 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2000); Blankenship and Assocs. v. NLRB, 999 F.2d 248, 250 (7th Cir. 1993); 
NLRB v. George J. Roberts & Sons, Inc., 451 F.2d 941, 944 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 31. 353 U.S. 313 (1957). 
 32. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006). 
 33. Office Employees, 353 U.S. at 318. 
 34. Id. at 314 n.3 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006) (emphasis added)). 
 35. Id. at 318 (quoting NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 36.  Id. 
 37. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). 
 38. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 91 (1995). See also NLRB v. Action Auto., 
Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 497-98 (1985); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984). 
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U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,39 the Board undoubtedly 
may interpret “silent or ambiguous” NLRA terms in a reasonable manner.40  And as 
a matter of national labor policy, one would think that the Board, which is charged 
by Congress with eliminating employer and union unfair labor practices,41 would 
look to extend the NLRA’s protections to as many members of the working class as 
would constitute a reasonable interpretation of the statute.  But by choosing to 
decline jurisdiction over certain subcategories of workers, the Bush II Board, in 
three instances, chose to read certain subclasses of employees out of the NLRA and 
created a new test for reading out many more workers.   
As a threshold matter, the Bush II Board proclaimed that, despite the near-
universal breadth of the statutory language, it “ha[d] the discretion to determine 
whether it would effectuate national labor policy to extend collective-bargaining 
rights to [a particular] category of employees,” and that it was “not compelled to 
include [that category of employees] in a bargaining unit if the Board determines it 
would not effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act to do so.”42  Applying 
that rationale, the Bush II Board declined to exercise authority over several 
subclasses of employees, most notably salts,43 graduate teaching or research 
assistants,44 and severely disabled workers.45 
In the most recent case, Toering Electric Co., the Bush II Board held that salts 
(i.e., paid union organizers who seek employment with an employer for the purpose 
of organizing that employer’s workforce)46 are not statutory employees in 
circumstances where the salt does not intend to accept a job if offered.47  The Bush 
II Board based its decision on several arguments that fly in the face of both 
Supreme Court precedent and other case precedent.  As an initial matter, the Bush 
II Board, mischaracterizing Supreme Court precedent that discusses the NLRA’s 
strikingly broad definition of employee,48 asserted that it need not “extend[] the 
protections of statutory employees to all other workers who are not specifically 
excluded”49 from the statute’s definition.  The Bush II Board then cited its own 
relatively recent cases to justify its argument that such a broad definition of 
employee would be contrary to precedent, ignoring the fact that more longstanding 
                                                                                                     
 39. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 40. Id. at 843-44. 
 41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) and (b) (2006). 
 42. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 492 (emphasis added). 
 43. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225 (2007). 
 44. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 483.   
 45. Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 982 (2004). 
 46. Some believe that the term salt “may be derived from the phrase ‘salting a mine,’ which is the 
artificial introduction of metal or ore into a mine by subterfuge to create the false impression that the 
material was naturally occurring.”  Tualatin Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 84 F.3d 1202, 1203 n.1 (9th Cir. 
1996).  See also Victor J. Van Bourg & Ellyn Moscowitz, Salting the Mines: The Legal and Political 
Implications of Placing Paid Union Organizers in the Employer's Workplace, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 1, 5 (1998). 
 47. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 225. 
 48. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) (“The breadth of [Section] 2(3)'s 
definition is striking: the Act squarely applies to ‘any employee.’”); NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 
Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 91 (1995) (upholding the Board’s “broad, literal interpretation” of Section 2(3) as 
consistent with the NLRA’s plain language, its statutory purposes, and interpretative case law).  
 49. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 228. 
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precedent from previous Boards would dictate a different result.50   
After narrowly interpreting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB—a Supreme Court 
case famously (and broadly) holding that job applicants are treated as statutory 
employees under the Act51—the Bush II Board questioned whether “job applicants 
who lack a genuine interest in seeking an employment relationship are not 
[statutory] employees.”52  The Bush II Board held that “an applicant for 
employment entitled to protection as a Section 2(3) employee is someone 
genuinely interested in seeking to establish an employment relationship with the 
employer,” and that “the General Counsel bears the ultimate burden of proving an 
individual’s genuine interest in seeking to establish an employment relationship 
with the employer.”53  The Bush II Board thereby circumvented the Supreme Court 
cases Phelps Dodge and NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.,54 by creating an 
unpersuasive distinction between job applicants who genuinely seek an 
employment relationship with an employer and those who do not.   
The Bush II Board based its holding on several factors.  First, with little 
discussion of the NLRA’s purposes or its legislative history, it viewed a 
“relationship between an employer and a putative job applicant who has no genuine 
interest in working for that employer” as not having “the economic relationship 
contemplated and protected by the Act.”55  Ignoring its own question—whether 
such individuals are statutory employees—the Board then rested its conclusion on 
its remedial authority, arguing that statutory policies against “windfall and punitive 
backpay awards” supported its holding.56  Citing Jefferson Standard—a Supreme 
Court case holding that employees engaged in disloyal product disparagement lose 
the NLRA’s protection57—the Board next suggested that salts, who seek only to 
provoke unfair labor practices by applying to employers who are hostile to 
unionization, are disloyal because their “conduct manifests a fundamental conflict 
of interests ab initio between the employer’s interest in doing business and the 
applicant’s interest in disrupting or eliminating this business.”58  In the same vein, 
the Board held that denying the NLRA’s protection to workers involved in these 
litigation-based salting campaigns is consistent with Town & Country Electric, the 
Supreme Court case that expressly rejected the argument that salts are inherently 
disloyal.59  The Court explained:  
                                                                                                     
 50. Id. (citing Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982 (2004); Brown Univ., 342 
N.L.R.B. at 488).  The Bush II Board also cites a Clinton Board decision, WBAI Pacifica Foundation, 
328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1274-75 (1999), a case easily distinguishable as involving unpaid staff positions. 
 51. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185 (1941). 
 52. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 229. 
 53. Id. at 228 (emphasis added). 
 54. 516 U.S. 85, 92, 96-98 (1995) (unanimously upholding the Board’s interpretation of NLRA 
Section 2(3) as including paid union organizers). 
 55. Toering Electric Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 228. 
 56. Id. at 229. 
 57. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 
464, 472 (1953). 
 58. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 231.  As Professor Robert Bastress pointed out to me, this 
quotation speaks volumes about the Bush II Board’s attitude toward unions.  No rational union, whose 
interest is to keep its members in jobs, is out to “eliminat[e] business.”  
 59. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 92-98 (upholding the Board’s interpretation of NLRA 
Section 2(3) as including paid union organizers). 
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[The Company] argues that, when the paid union organizer serves the union . . . 
the organizer is acting adversely to the company. . . .  Thus, it concludes, the 
worker must be the servant (i.e., the “employee”) of the union alone. . . .  [That] 
argument fails . . . because . . . it lacks sufficient support in common law.  The 
Restatement’s hornbook rule (to which the quoted commentary is appended) says 
that a “person may be the servant of two masters . . . at one time as to one act, if 
the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other.”60 
It is noteworthy that the Bush II Board essentially disenfranchised salts in the 
face of the Supreme Court’s unanimous holding in Town & Country Electric and 
circuit precedent unanimously upholding backpay awards to salts.  As the Second 
Circuit, quoting Phelps Dodge, recently pointed out in upholding the Board’s 
backpay award to a salt:  
Discrimination against union labor in the hiring of [workers] is a dam to self 
organization at the source of supply.  The effect of such discrimination is not 
confined to the actual denial of employment; it inevitably operates against the 
whole idea of the legitimacy of organization. In a word, it undermines the 
principle which . . . is recognized as basic to the attainment of industrial peace.61 
The Bush II Board’s willingness to read a certain subclass of employees out of 
the NLRA’s protection is part of its trend toward restricting worker access to the 
NLRA’s fundamental protections by narrowing the statutory definition of 
employee.  For example, the Bush II Board held that teaching and research 
assistants at private universities are students and therefore are not statutory 
employees.62  The Bush II Board also held that “severely disabled” employees 
working as janitors are not statutory employees because their employment was 
primarily rehabilitative rather than economic.63   
It is also significant that the Bush II Board chose to exclude employees by 
category rather than on a case-by-case basis.64  The Bush II Board readily admits 
that its decision in Brown University was based on policy.  But rather than 
identifying even a single labor policy that its decision effectuated, the Board 
elaborates on a nonlabor policy:  “[D]eclining to extend collective-bargaining 
rights to students who perform services at their educational institutions, that are 
directly related to their educational program” is based on the “‘simple and 
straightforward’” distinction between workers who are “‘primarily  . . . students’” 
and those who are “‘primarily . . . employees.’”65  Based on that distinction, the 
                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 93-95 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 226 (1957) (emphasis added by 
the Court)). 
 61. NLRB v. Ferguson Elec. Co., 242 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185 (1941)).  See also Tualatin Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 714 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (upholding backpay award to salt); Aneco Inc. v. NLRB, 285 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding 
backpay award to salt but cutting back on the amount of that award).  
 62. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 483.  For a powerful discussion of just how destructive the Brown 
decision is, see Ellen Dannin, Understanding How Employees’ Rights To Organize Under the National 
Labor Relations Act Have Been Limited:  The Case of Brown University, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY  Aug. 2008, available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Dannin%20 
Issue%20Brief.pdf. 
 63. Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 982 (2004). 
 64. See Dannin, supra note 62 (discussing the lack of authority for this action). 
 65. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 489 (quoting St. Clare’s Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002 (1977)). 
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Board injected the following test into the statutory definition of employee:  whether 
the relationship between the worker and the employer is “predominantly . . . 
economic in nature.”66  This test is applied in each of the three cases of categorical 
exclusion: (1) graduate teaching assistants are primarily students, not workers in a 
predominantly economic relationship with an employer; (2) disabled workers are 
not employees to the extent that they are in a primarily rehabilitative, rather than 
economic, relationship with their employer; and (3) salts are not statutory 
employees to the extent that they do not intend to create an economic relationship 
with their employer.  With that test, the Bush II Board categorically excludes these 
three worker classifications. 
The Bush II Board’s construction of the statutory term employee—one that 
injects as a condition of statutory protection the intent (or capacity) to create a 
predominantly economic relationship with an employer—is not a reasonable 
construction of NLRA Section 2(3).  To paraphrase the Court in Office Employees 
International Union, Local No. 11 v. NLRB—where it struck down the Board’s 
categorical exclusion of a subcategory of union employers under NLRA Section 
2(2)—such an “arbitrary blanket exclusion of employe[e]s as a class is beyond the 
power of the Board.”67  As with the Board’s interpretation of the statutory term 
employer, not only is the Bush II Board’s construction of the statutory term 
employee contrary to the broad definition that includes all employees except those 
that are expressly exempted, but that narrow statutory construction also allows the 
Board to renounce jurisdiction over an entire category of employees, all of whom 
are important segments of American work life.68 
Nor are the Bush II Board’s administrative actions consistent with the Board’s 
longstanding policy of declining jurisdiction over some cases, such as those where 
gross annual volume is below a certain dollar amount.  In those cases, it is 
reasonable for the Board to avoid litigation over the constitutional limits of its own 
jurisdiction.69  By contrast, the Bush II Board’s actions are more analogous to the 
type of actions the Court struck down in Office Employees; in both cases, the Board 
facially excluded an entire category of people, who otherwise would have come 
within the Board’s jurisdiction. 
But even assuming that the NLRA’s broad statutory protection does not pose a 
legal obstacle to the Board’s new test, it remains difficult to imagine what labor 
policy is actually effectuated by that test.  Narrowing the definition of employee—
by requiring employees to intend only (or at least primarily) to create an economic 
                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 489; accord Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. at 984. 
 67. 353 U.S. at 318. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988) (recognizing, in the NLRA context, the longstanding principle of construing statutes to 
avoid serious constitutional problems) (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 
64, 118 (1804)); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 499-502 (1979); Am. Commc’n Ass’n v. 
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 407-08 (1950).   But while it is true that there remains a constitutional distinction 
between intrastate and interstate commerce, the Board could probably impose a much lower dollar limit 
and still avoid a constitutional problem.  For further explication of the extent and limits of the Interstate 
Commerce Clause’s reach, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limits); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (extent); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) 
(extent). 
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relationship with their employers—does not promote collective bargaining between 
those nonemployee-workers and their employers.  Nor does it do anything to 
equalize bargaining power between those nonemployee-workers and their 
employers.  Nor does the Bush II Board explain why nonemployee-workers, such 
as students and disabled workers (both of whom are particularly vulnerable and 
powerless), are less entitled to claim the fundamental rights embodied in Section 7.  
Nor has the Board explained how narrowing the definition of employee promotes 
industrial peace.   
Rather, the Bush II Board’s test examines the question of statutory-employee 
status from the employer’s vantage point:  Will the employer economically benefit 
from this relationship? Ignoring the fact that employers always benefit 
economically from the labor output of their workers, the Bush II Board proceeds to 
explain that if the answer to its question is no—either because the worker is 
primarily a student, or a disabled worker whom the employer is helping to 
rehabilitate, or the worker intends to organize the employer’s workplace—then 
those workers are not employees for purposes of a statute intended to promote the 
fundamental right of workers to self-organize for the purposes of collective 
bargaining and mutual aid or protection. 
On the flip side, the Bush II Board’s analysis discounts the economic value of 
the relationship to the nonemployee-worker. For example, graduate teaching 
assistants accept those work assignments not merely because they might learn 
something from the job but also because they are typically paid for performing 
those jobs, which are often bundled with tuition waivers or other things of 
economic value. To say that all graduate teaching or research assistants are 
therefore disenfranchised from their Section 7 right to band together for mutual aid 
or protection merely because they are “primarily” students—and therefore have not 
created a relationship that is primarily economic in nature—hinges the worker’s 
right to organize and band together for mutual aid or protection on the employer’s 
interest. That construction of the NLRA, rather than promoting the values 
underlining the Act, eviscerates them. 
3.  The Bush II Board, with the Help of the Other Branches of Government, Further 
Narrows the Definition of Employee by Broadening the Statutory Supervisory 
Exemption 
A slightly different analysis applies to the statutory exemptions from the 
definition of employee.  Consistent with canons of statutory construction, previous 
Boards have narrowly construed NLRA exemptions.  This is particularly apparent 
when examining the history of the Board’s attempt to construe the statutory 
supervisory exemption in the context of the nursing profession.  NLRA Section 
2(11) defines supervisor as “any individual having authority, in the interest of the 
employer, to . . . assign . . . or responsibly to direct [other employees] . . . if in 
connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority . . . requires the use of 
independent judgment.”70  In Doctors’ Hospital of Modesto, Inc., a case decided in 
1970, the Board determined that a hospital's registered nurses were not supervisors, 
                                                                                                     
 70. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006). 
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even though they directed other, less-skilled employees.71  In the Board’s view, the 
nurses’ “daily on-the-job duties and authority in this regard are solely a product of 
their highly developed professional skills and do not, without more, constitute an 
exercise of supervisory authority in the interest of their [e]mployer.”72  In 1992, in 
Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America (HCR), the Board, which was made 
up of predominantly Republican appointees, had no trouble applying its 
longstanding precedent to conclude that the nurses in that case were employees, not 
supervisors.73  But the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed, finding that the 
Board’s patient-care analysis “created a false dichotomy . . . between acts taken in 
connection with patient care and acts taken in the interest of the employer.” 74 
In Providence Hospital, in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in HCR, 
the Clinton Board—under the leadership of Chairman William B. Gould IV75—
defined the term “independent judgment” in a manner that attempted to reconcile 
NLRA Section 2(11)’s exclusion of supervisors with Section 2(12)’s definition of 
professional employees.76 In particular, the Clinton Board explained that 
independent judgment does not include “ordinary professional or technical 
judgment in directing less skilled employees to deliver services”77  In NLRB v. 
Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., a divided Supreme Court rejected that 
interpretation.78 
Any further attempts to narrowly construe the supervisory exemption ended 
with the Bush II Board.  In addition to the decisions handed down in the September 
Massacre, the Bush II Board—following the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
Clinton Board’s construction of “independent judgment”79—has contributed to 
congressional and judicial deterioration of the NLRA’s protective cover by issuing 
a series of cases, known as the Oakwood Trilogy, that further broaden the statutory 
supervisory exemption in light of the aforementioned Supreme Court rulings.80  
Piggybacking on Kentucky River, the Board will now consider the greater skilled 
workers’ professional or technical direction of lesser skilled employees in 
determining whether the greater skilled worker is a supervisor.81 
                                                                                                     
 71. 183 N.L.R.B. 950, 950 (1970), enforced, 489 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 72. Id. at 951. 
 73. 306 N.L.R.B. 63, 63 n.1 (1992), enforcement denied, 987 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 511 
U.S. 571 (1994). 
 74. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 577 (1994). 
 75. Chairman Gould is the Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus, at Stanford Law 
School. 
 76. 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 725-30 (1996). 
 77. Id. at 732 (“Charge nurses’ daily assignments do not require any independent judgment that 
goes beyond the professional judgment required of a supervisor.”). 
 78. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713-21 (2001) (5-4 decision). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006); Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 717 
(2006); Golden Crest Healthcare Ctr., 348 N.L.R.B. 727 (2006). 
 81. The Oakwood Trilogy is infamous not only for expanding the definition of the statutory term 
independent judgment in a manner that tends to swallow professional employees, but also for otherwise 
expanding the supervisor exemption in a way that punches a gapping hole in the otherwise seemingly 
broad statutory definition of employee.  By coupling broad definitions of “assign” and “responsible 
direction” with such a broad conception of independent judgment, the Board makes concrete the 
concerns of Kentucky River’s dissent—that most professional employees are no longer covered by the 
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While these cases are troubling, this trend did not start with the Bush II Board.  
In fact, the most apparent sources of this trend come from congressional 
amendments to the NLRA and from the court decisions interpreting those 
amendments.  Most famously, through the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the 
original NLRA, it was Congress—not the Court and not the Board—that excluded 
both independent contractors82 and supervisors83 from the otherwise strikingly 
broad definition of the statutory term “employee.”84  Indeed, Congress created 
these exemptions—i.e., disenfranchised these workers—in reaction to the Supreme 
Court’s approval of Board precedent extending the Act’s protections to such 
employees.85  As explained above, in the last half-century, the Supreme Court has 
contributed to this trend and broadened the supervisory exemption by twice 
rejecting the Board’s interpretation of that statutory term.86   
These governmental acts—Congress’s enactment of statutory exemptions, the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to accept narrow interpretations of those statutory 
exemptions, and the Bush II Board’s broader-than-necessary interpretation of those 
exemptions—demonstrate the extent to which each branch of government has 
contributed to narrowing the NLRA’s protective coverage.87  Once again, this is 
significant.  As observed above, if a worker does not come within the statutory 
definition of employee, that employee is not protected by the NLRA.  Workers who 
are not protected by the NLRA—or some other labor statute88—are generally at-
will employees who can be fired for any reason, including the bad reason of 
coming to the aid of their coworker.  For example, an employer remains free to fire 
a nonstatutory worker who merely asks the boss for a cost-of-living raise on behalf 
of an entire plant.89   
                                                                                                     
NLRA.  The trilogy then goes beyond Kentucky River by finding supervisory status among workers who 
merely exercise supervisory authority on a rotating basis. 
 82. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). 
 83. Id.;  id. § 152(11). 
 84. NLRA Section 2(3) defines the term “employee” to include “any employee,” unless expressly 
excluded by the NLRA.  29 U.S.C. § 152(3).  The Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized this 
statutory definition as “broad.”  See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  
 85. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (2006), legislatively overruling Packard Motor 
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) and NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 86. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 578-80 (1994) (rejecting the Board’s 
interpretation of “in the interest of the employer” prong of three-prong statutory test for “supervisor” set 
forth in NLRA); Ky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. at 712-22 (rejecting the Board’s interpretation of 
“supervisor” in the context of “professional employees,” by rejecting the Board’s interpretation of the 
ambiguous term “independent judgment”). 
 87. See also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974) 
(upholding the Board’s exclusion of managerial employees from NLRA protection); NLRB v. 
Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 176-77, 180-85 (1981) (upholding the 
Board’s “labor nexus” test for excluding from the NLRA confidential employees who “assist and act in 
a confidential capacity to persons who exercise ‘managerial’ functions in the field of labor relations”). 
 88. For example, state employees are not covered by the NLRA, see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006), but 
do tend to be covered under state labor statutes. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-3(d) (West 2009) 
(defining New Jersey public employees as “any employee”).  Other employees come under the Railway 
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).   
 89. Indeed, the Court’s interference with workers’ right to organize has been so deeply felt by the 
labor community that it has taken the bold step of filing a complaint with the International Labor 
Organization.  Complaint by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
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4.  The Bush II Board’s Further Assaults on Salts—Rights Without Remedies 
It is perhaps cliché to observe that there is no right without a remedy.90  Along 
these lines, the Bush II Board’s decision in Toering Electric comes on the heels of 
another Bush II Board decision designed to limit the backpay remedy available to 
salts.  In Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc.,91 the Bush II Board held that it would “no 
longer apply a presumption of indefinite employment” in the context of an 
employer’s discriminatory discharge of a union salt.  This has the effect of 
attacking the remedy—by sharply restricting backpay—that might attach to a 
violation of a statutory right, rendering it a right without a remedy.   
Coupling Toering Electric with Oil Capitol, it becomes obvious that the Bush 
II Board has “cut off the remedy, just in case there [wa]s any right remaining.”92  
As with other cases handed down during the September Massacre, the Bush II 
Board’s willingness to recognize a right without a corresponding remedy is part of 
a larger trend.  In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held that 
undocumented workers were statutory “employees,” but that it may be 
inappropriate to award backpay without considering the employees’ legal 
availability for work or actual economic losses.93  The Supreme Court later used 
this observation to form the basis of its decision in Hoffmann Plastic Compounds, 
Inc. v. NLRB, where the Court held that congressional policies underlying the 
federal immigration laws foreclosed the Board from awarding backpay to 
undocumented aliens who have never been legally authorized to work in the United 
States, even though those workers are employees under the NLRA.94  In Hoffmann, 
the Supreme Court rejected the NLRB’s argument that the backpay award deters 
                                                                                                     
Organizations to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association Against the Government of the United 
States of America for Violation of Fundamental Rights of Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right To Organize and Bargain Collectively Concerning Employees Classified as “Supervisors” Under 
the National Labor Relations Act, filed Oct. 23, 2006, http://www.aflcio.org/ joinaunion/ voiceatwork/ 
upload/ilo_complaint.pdf.  The ILO recently ruled in the AFL-CIO’s favor.  See 349th Report of the 
Committee on Freedom of Association (March 2008), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_ 091464.pdf. 
 90. “[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal 
remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded . . . [I]t is a settled and invariable 
principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury 
its proper redress.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23, *109).  I am grateful to Professor Caprice Roberts for discussing 
this point with me. 
 In a case of first impression, in the context of reviewing the NLRB’s award of backpay to a salt, the 
Second Circuit recognized the right-without-a-remedy cliché but observed that at least in the labor 
context a particular person’s right may have no remedy:  “While black letter law teaches that where 
there is a right there is a remedy, ‘employee’ status under the [NLRA] does not necessarily mean 
entitlement to backpay in the face of an unfair labor practice.”  NLRB v. Ferguson Elec. Co., Inc., 242 
F.3d 426, 430 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 894, 905-06) (holding that 
undocumented workers were statutory “employees,” but that it was inappropriate to impose even a 
minimal backpay award without regard to the employees' legal availability for work or actual economic 
losses).   
 91. 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. 6 (May 31, 2007). 
 92. Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights:  The Autonomous 
Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 61 (2007). 
 93. 467 U.S. at 894, 899-906. 
 94. 535 U.S. 137, 145-51 (2002). 
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employers from violating both labor and immigration laws.95 
This right-without-a-remedy-phenomenon is part of an even larger trend in 
labor law:  the weakening of remedies in general.  I take up that question later in 
this Article.  But first, I would like to examine the types of activities that the NLRA 
protects under Section 7 and give three examples from the Bush II Board that 
demonstrate the shrinking contours of Section 7. 
C.  The Shrinking Contours of Section 7 
1.  Workers’ Section 7 Rights Necessarily Encompass the Right To Communicate 
Effectively with One Another Regarding Self-Organization at the Jobsite but Those 
Rights Differ Depending on Whether the Organizer Is or Is Not a Statutory 
Employee 
Section 7 is the statutory keystone of the NLRA.  It provides, in pertinent part: 
  Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.96 
By the NLRA’s plain language, Section 7 protects the fundamental right of 
workers to, among other things, “self-organiz[e],” “bargain collectively,” and band 
together for “mutual aid or protection.”97  Employers plainly violate the rights of 
workers, and commit unfair labor practices, when they “interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of [these] rights.”98 
The Supreme Court has also repeatedly affirmed the view that “the task of 
defining the scope of [Section] 7 ‘is for the Board to perform in the first 
instance.’”99  But while it is the Board’s primary obligation to protect the integrity 
of those boundaries, it is ultimately up to the courts to enforce them.  Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court has “long accepted” the Board’s view that Section 7 
“necessarily encompasses the right effectively to communicate with one another 
regarding self-organization at the jobsite.”100  The Court has also recognized the 
Board’s view that Section 7 “organization rights are not viable in a vacuum; their 
effectiveness depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the 
advantages and disadvantages of organization from others.”101   
But the statutory right to receive information at the jobsite has evolved along 
two lines of cases:  Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB102 and Babcock/Lechmere.  
                                                                                                     
 95. Id. at 153-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief for the Respondent at 29-37, Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-1595) (brief available at 2001 WL 1597748, 
*29-*37). 
 96. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. § 158(a)(1) (2006).   See also Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945). 
 99. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984) (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 
U.S. 556, 568 (1978)). 
 100. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978). 
 101. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543 (1972). 
 102. 324 U.S. 793. 
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Interpreting the statutory language of Section 7, the Supreme Court long ago 
affirmed in Republic Aviation that absent special circumstances, employees have a 
statutory right to engage in organizational activities at the jobsite in nonworking 
areas during nonworking time.103  By contrast, in 1956 in NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co. and again in 1992 in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the NLRA does not grant nonemployee union organizers access to employer-
owned property even for the purpose of communicating with employees about the 
benefits of unionization.104  The Court held in Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB that 
Section 7 rights generally yield to employers’ property rights, even though Section 
7 “necessarily encompasses the right effectively to communicate . . . at the 
jobsite.”105 
Therefore, the distinction between employee and nonemployee is a significant 
one under the NLRA not only for determining who is protected by labor law—the 
statutory employee is protected and the nonemployee is not—but also for 
determining who gets access to the jobsite for purposes of workplace organizing.  
Employee-union organizers get statutory access to the jobsite; nonemployee-union 
organizers generally do not. 
2.  The Bush II Board’s Decisions and Other Government Decisions Disregard 
Workers’ Section 7 Right To Receive Information About the Benefits of Self-
Organization at the Workplace 
a.  The Supreme Court’s Babcock/Lechmere Doctrine and the Bush II Board’s 
Treatment of Salts Read Together Repress Workers’ Section 7 Right To Self-
Organize 
The use of salts is a good example of how unions strategized to legally work 
around the Babcock/Lechmere obstacle to organizing; however, after initial success 
those efforts were repressed by the Bush II Board.106  Labor law’s treatment of salts 
illustrates a larger historical trend of repressing workers’ fundamental right to 
organize.   
As discussed above, one union response to the Babcock/Lechmere line of cases 
was to use the “inside” employee organizer or salt.  Because nonemployee union 
organizers do not have access to employees at the jobsite, unions have relied on 
what the management community viewed as a “Trojan Horse” strategy of 
                                                                                                     
 103. Id. at 803-04 n.10.  For a recent application of this rule, see Salmon Run Shopping Ctr. LLC v. 
NLRB, 534 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 2008).   
 104. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 113-14; Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 537, 540-541.  The 
Babcock/Lechmere line of cases is subject to two exceptions under which employers’ property rights 
must yield to Section 7 rights.  First, employers may not discriminatorily post their property against 
union solicitation.  Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 112.  Second, employers’ property rights must 
yield where there are no alternative means of communication.  Id.; Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 537. See 
also Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. v. NLRB, 190 F.3d 1008, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that union 
must be granted access to oil-well drilling camp, where employees stay during their two-week work 
cycle). 
 105. 437 U.S. at 491. 
 106. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing how the Supreme Court, in Town & 
Country Electric, unanimously held that salts are statutory employees). 
216 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
infiltrating the enemy from within.107  Management viewed salts as the foot soldier 
in that war.108  The unions’ strategy was effective.  As explained above, the 
management community turned to the courts for help but lost in Town & Country 
Electric, where a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the Board’s construction of the 
NLRA as protecting salts.109  More important than its holding is the reasoning of 
that decision; the Supreme Court reaffirmed the point of Phelps Dodge—that 
organizing is not disloyal and that the Trojan Horse metaphor is ultimately 
wrong—emphasizing that there is no inconsistency between being a good 
employee and engaging in union organizing activity.110  Since Town & Country 
Electric, the management community has fought back and, with the Bush II Board, 
found a government entity willing to do its bidding.   
Toering Electric (where the Board placed on the General Counsel the burden 
of proving that a salt has a genuine interest in seeking to establish an employment 
relationship)111 and Oil Capitol (where the Board announced that it would no 
longer apply a presumption of indefinite employment in the context of an 
employer’s discriminatory discharge of a union salt)112 make it much harder for 
unions and the General Counsel to investigate and prove their cases.  Moreover, the 
harder it is to prove a case, the more cases fall by the wayside.  Cutting down on 
reinstatement and backpay also effectively blunts salting.  The more reinstatement 
and backpay remedies are weakened, the less an employer has to fear by treating 
salts unlawfully. 
Simply put, under the Babcock/Lechmere line of cases, which generally allows 
employers to post their property against union organizers, workers are not readily 
able to receive information from nonemployee-union organizers at the jobsite.  
Now, under the Bush II Board’s line of cases involving salts, workers are much less 
able to receive information from employee-union organizers at the jobsite.  
Reading those two lines of cases together, the Board and the courts have effectively 
limited the Section 7 right of employees to receive information about the benefits 
of unionization at the jobsite. 
Board decisions are reviewed on a case-by-case basis, so courts are likely to 
miss the larger picture—the systematic undermining of the NLRA’s policies.  
While this picture might be clearer to the Supreme Court, which does routinely 
entertain policy arguments, the reality is that the Supreme Court has accepted, on 
average, less than one NLRB case per year in the last decade.113  This trend has not 
                                                                                                     
 107. See Judd H. Lees, Hiring the Trojan Horse: The Union Business Agent as a Protected 
Applicant, 42 LAB. L.J. 8, 14 (1991); Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1232 (1992) (Oviatt, 
concurring) (stating that salts are “reminiscent of the Trojan Horse whose innocuous appearance shields 
a deadly enemy”); Michael H. Gottesman, Labor, Employment and Benefit Decisions of the Supreme 
Court’s 1995-96 Term, 12 LAB. LAW. 325, 331 & n.23 (1997). 
 108. For additional explanations about what historical events in the development of NLRA case law 
encouraged the practice of salting, see Van Bourg & Moscowitz, supra note 46, at 9-16. 
 109. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 92, 96-98. 
 110. Id. at 87-88, 90-98. 
 111. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 228. 
 112. Oil Capitol, 349 N.L.R.B. at 1353. 
 113. The Supreme Court has passed on only four NLRB cases (all of which the Board lost) in the 
past ten years and another nine cases (most of which the Board won) in the previous ten years:  BE&K 
Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002) (reversing Board); Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. 137 (reversing 
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gone unnoticed by academics, who have the luxury of surveying the entire 
landscape.114  The Babcock/Lechmere doctrine, together with the Bush II Board’s 
view of salting campaigns (as affirmed in Toering Electric), contravene the purpose 
of the NLRA—to “protect[] by law . . . the right of employees to organize and 
bargain collectively.”115 
b.  The Bush II Board’s Register Guard Decision Further Represses Workers’ 
Section 7 Right To Self-Organize 
The Bush II Board coupled its policy of limiting paid union organizers’ access 
to the workplace with a policy of limiting the reach of Republic Aviation Corp. v. 
NLRB.116  In Register Guard,117 the Bush II Board held that a company did not 
commit an unfair labor practice when it, among other things, disciplined an 
employee for using the company’s e-mail system for disseminating union 
information, even though the company permitted its employees to use its e-mail 
system for other personal business such as jokes, party invitations, and birth 
announcements.118   
Putting aside the employee’s use of the company’s e-mail system for the 
moment, such a holding represents a clear departure from the long-settled rules of 
Republic Aviation and its progeny.  Under that line of cases, employers may not 
promulgate overly broad no-solicitation rules;119 employers may not disparately 
enforce even facially valid no-solicitation rules;120 and employers must allow their 
employees to engage in union solicitation in nonworking areas during nonworking 
times.121  And indeed, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit readily drew the 
conclusion that such company conduct is unlawful.122 
                                                                                                     
Board); Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (reversing Board); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., 
Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998) (reversing Board on substantial evidence grounds); Auciello Iron 
Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781 (1996) (upholding Board); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 
392 (1996) (upholding Board); Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85 (upholding Board); NLRB v. Health 
Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (reversing Board); ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 
U.S. 317 (1994) (upholding Board); Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. 527 (reversing Board); Litton Fin. 
Printing Div., a Div. of Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991) (reversing Board in part); 
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991) (upholding Board); NLRB v. Curtin Matheson 
Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990) (upholding Board).  The Supreme Court also recently granted 
certiorari in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 77 U. 
S.L.W. 3670, 78 U. S.L.W. 3012, 78 U. S.L.W. 3245, 78 U. S.L.W. 3251 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-
1457).  Oral argument is scheduled for March 23, 2010. See also infra n.189 and accompanying text. 
 114. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. 
LAB. LAW & POL’Y J. 221 (2005). 
 115. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 116. 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
 117. Guard Publ’g Co. (Register Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), review granted in pertinent 
part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 118. Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 1117. 
 119. See, e.g., Poly-America, Inc. v. NLRB, 260 F.3d 465, 482 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 120. See, e.g., ITT Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 995, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Rest. Corp. of Am. v. 
NLRB, 827 F.2d 799, 804-05 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Waste Mgmt., 329 N.L.R.B. 198, 199-200 (1999). 
 121. See Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 796-99. 
 122. Guard Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53, 58-62 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  The court did not reach the 
question whether the company’s particular rule was invalid because the question was not raised.  Id. at 
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But Register Guard remains noteworthy for what it says about the Bush II 
Board’s inclination to repress union organizing.  In an attempt to circumvent 
longstanding Supreme Court, appellate court, and Board precedent, the Bush II 
Board held that those cases did not apply because although statutory employees 
have an NLRA right to solicit at the jobsite, they do not have a right to use the 
company’s equipment.123  The Bush II Board equated e-mail access to other forms 
of media, such as bulletin boards and televisions, rather than examining whether 
employers might be justified on managerial grounds to limit access to some 
equipment but not to other; it thereby created a blanket rule denying access.  The 
Bush II Board further concluded that there was no unlawful discrimination because 
the employee’s union communications were of a sufficiently different nature from 
jokes and birth announcements that the company was warranted in treating the two 
situations differently.124  In so holding, the Bush II Board expressly stated that it 
was modifying its own precedent.125  Once again it modified its precedent in a 
manner that was less protective of employees’ organizational rights. 
c.  The Bush II Board’s Refusal To Extend Weingarten to Nonunion Employees 
Represses Workers’ Section 7 Right To Band Together for Mutual Aid or 
Protection 
Almost a half-century ago, the Supreme Court recognized that Section 7’s 
broad protection applied to nonunionized employees who must “speak for 
themselves as best they could” because they have no bargaining representative.126  
Thirteen years later, in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld the 
Board’s interpretation of Section 7 as creating an employee right to refuse to 
submit, without union representation, to an investigatory interview that the 
employee “reasonably believes . . . will result in disciplinary action.”127  The Court 
held that the statutory right to union representation in this context “inheres in 
[Section] 7’s guarantee of the right of employees to act in concert for mutual aid 
and protection.”128  The Court further explained that the “action of an employee in 
seeking to have the assistance of his union representative at a confrontation with 
his employer clearly falls within the literal wording of [Section 7’s mutual aid or 
protection clause].”129 
When first presented with the question whether to apply Weingarten to 
nonunion employees in the unorganized workplace, the Board held that the 
Weingarten rule should apply in this context.130  Over the next several years, the 
Board oscillated between two policies—one that extended the Weingarten right of 
                                                                                                     
58.  The court instead held that the company discriminatorily enforced its rule to discourage union 
activity in violation of NLRA Section 8(a)(1).  Id. at 58-61. 
 123. Guard Publ’g Co. (Register Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1114-17 (2007). 
 124. Id. at 1116-20. 
 125. Id. at 1117. 
 126. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962). 
 127. 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975). 
 128. Id. at 256. 
 129. Id. at 260. 
 130. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982). 
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representation to the nonunion workplace and one that did not.131 Given the 
politicized nature of this labor law issue, the Bush II Board not surprisingly took 
the position in IBM Corp. that the Weingarten rule should not apply to employees 
in the nonunion workplace.132 
The significant point here is that the Bush II Board, along with the Reagan 
Board but unlike the Clinton and Carter Boards, decided to shrink the contours of 
Section 7’s protective reach by shrinking the otherwise long arm of the mutual aid 
or protection clause.  This is so, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s observation 
that the right to representation during an investigatory/disciplinary meeting is 
“clearly” within the literal meaning of Section 7’s mutual aid or protection 
clause.133  And this is so, notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit’s recent holding that the 
Clinton Board’s policy extending such Weingarten rights to the nonunion setting is 
a permissible construction of the NLRA.134 
But even more significantly, the Bush II Board chose to shrink Section 7’s 
broad protective cover in a way that flies in the face of the NLRA’s historical 
import.  In the era of union repression, not many years before, Congress enacted 
the NLRA, workers who banded together for mutual aid faced criminal conspiracy 
charges.  And although the subsequent, brief period of tolerance helped to 
immunize unions and employees from such charges, the early twentieth century 
witnessed oscillation between tolerance and repression until passage of the Wagner 
Act in 1935.  One of the main purposes of the NLRA—then and now—is to 
establish the balance of power between workers and employers135 by protecting 
workers who engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”136 from employer interference,137 
regardless of whether those workers have a designated bargaining representative.138  
Simply put, these cases represent repressed concerted activity of the most 
vulnerable workers—unrepresented workers on the verge of discipline.  And while 
employees are no longer criminally prosecuted for bringing their co-workers in 
with them to act as a witness to a disciplinary meeting, they are subject to dismissal 
for such conduct. 
D.  The Bush II Board’s Swipe at the Right to Strike Fits into the Larger Trend 
                                                                                                     
 131. See IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004) overruling Epilepsy Found., 331 N.L.R.B. 676 
(2000); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 232 (1985) overruling Materials Research Corp., 262 
N.L.R.B. 1010 (holding that the NLRA compels the conclusion that nonunion employees have no 
Weingarten rights); E. I. DuPont de Nemours, 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 630-31 (1988) (disavowing its 
reasoning in Sears—that the NLRA compels that conclusion—and finding that limiting Weingarten 
rights to union employees “best effectuate[s] the purposes of the [NLRA]”), enforced in 876 F.2d 11 (3d 
Cir. 1989).   
 132. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. at 1288 overruling Epilepsy Found., 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000). See 
also Catherine Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile:  Problems with Its 
Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2025 & nn.55-58 (2009). 
 133. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260. 
 134. Epilepsy Found. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 135. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 136. Id. § 157. 
 137. Id. § 158(a)(1). 
 138. See Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14. 
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That Has Weakened or Removed Available Economic Weapons 
The right to strike is protected by NLRA Section 7, which protects employees’ 
right to band together for mutual aid or protection,139 and Section 13, which 
prohibits the Board or reviewing courts from “constru[ing the NLRA] so as either 
to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect 
the limitations or qualifications on that right.”140 Statutory language 
notwithstanding, the Bush II Board made subtle changes in its precedent that 
diminished the right to strike. 
In Jones Plastic & Engineering Co., the Bush II Board chipped away at the 
economic power behind the employees’ statutory right to strike, holding that 
employers may treat striker replacement workers as permanent even when hired 
“at-will.”141  Until recently, the employer bore the burden of proving the permanent 
status of the replacements by “showing that there was a mutual understanding 
between the [employer] and the replacements that the nature of their employment 
was permanent.”142  In particular, the employer was required to establish “that the 
replacements were hired in a manner that would ‘show that the men [and women] 
who replaced the strikers were regarded by themselves and the [employer] as 
having received their jobs on a permanent basis.”’143   
Unless Jones Plastic is interpreted to mean that an employer always satisfies 
its burden of showing a mutual understanding merely by showing that it hired 
replacement workers at-will, then Jones Plastics is a relatively minor change in the 
law.  Seen differently, however, there is a larger historical trend at play, in which 
unions’ economic weapons have been blunted almost beyond recognition.  Nothing 
in the plain text of the NLRA supports the right of employers to combat a strike by 
hiring replacement workers—an employer tactic that undoubtedly weakens the 
economic impact of a strike, thereby “diminish[ing]” the right to strike.144  Yet in 
its brief to the Supreme Court in NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., the 
Board informed the Supreme Court that employers have this right, notwithstanding 
the effect that this nonstatutory right has on the employees’ statutory right to strike:   
The Board has never contended, in this case or any other, that an employer who 
has neither caused nor prolonged a strike through unfair labor practices, cannot 
take full advantage of economic forces working for his victory in a labor dispute.  
The Act clearly does not forbid him, in the absence of such unfair labor practices, 
to replace the striking employees with new employees or authorize an order 
directing that all the strikers be reinstated and the new employees discharged.  
Admittedly the strikers are not “guaranteed” reinstatement by the Act. . . .  
Admittedly an employer is fully within his rights under the statute in refusing to 
reinstate striking employees when he has legally filled their positions . . . .  The 
                                                                                                     
 139. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 
U.S. 375, 378 (1967). 
 140. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006). 
 141. 351 N.L.R.B. 61, 67 (2007). 
 142. Target Rock Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 373, 373 (1997), enforced, 172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 143. Id. (quoting Ga. Highway Express, 165 N.L.R.B. 514, 516 (1967) aff’d sub nom. Truck Drivers 
& Helpers Local No. 728 v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).  
 144. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006). 
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Board did not question that right in this case.145 
Thus, blunting economic weapons had an early start.  As the quote above shows, in 
1938, one year after the Supreme Court declared the Wagner Act constitutional, the 
NLRB—the administrative agency charged by Congress with administering that 
Act—paved the way for the Supreme Court to dilute labor’s most powerful 
economic weapon.  It comes as little surprise, then, that the Supreme Court 
subsequently observed that an employer may maintain operations during an 
economic strike by employing permanent replacement workers:  “The assurance by 
[the employer] to those who accepted employment during the strike that if they so 
desired their places might be permanent was not an unfair labor practice nor was it 
such to reinstate only so many of the strikers as there were vacant places to be 
filled.”146   
But the damage did not stop with replacement workers.  The following year, 
the Supreme Court removed the sit-down strike from labor’s arsenal of economic 
weapons.147  Congress also raided labor’s economic arsenal.  Most significantly, 
subsequent amendments to the NLRA took away labor’s right to engage in 
secondary boycotts (e.g., the union’s legal right to picket any employer with which 
the union does not have a primary labor dispute), and, in most cases, to enter into 
hot cargo agreements (e.g., a contractual provision permitting employees to refrain 
from handling products from struck or non-union firms).148  Couple those 
amendments with the various ways in which the Supreme Court has blunted 
workers’ labor-picketing rights,149 and we witness the depletion of labor’s 
economic power within a generation.  It is no wonder that many labor advocates 
recommend keeping disputes away from the Board and out of the courts. 
E.  The Bush II Board’s Refusal To Use the Full Extent of Its Remedial Authority 
NLRA Section 10(c) authorizes the Board “to select and fashion” remedial 
                                                                                                     
 145. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 15-18, NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 
(1938) (No. 706), 1939 WL 48681.  Professor Samuel Estreicher argues that this interpretation of the 
NLRA is supported by the Act’s legislative history.  Samuel Estreicher, Collective Bargaining or 
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 146. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. at 346. 
 147. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgicual Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).  See generally James Gray Pope, 
How American Workers Lost the Right To Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518 (2004). 
 148. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), 158(e) (2006).  However, the right to enter into hot cargo agreements is 
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 149. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 618-19 (1980) 
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sufficiently appreciated”). See generally James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus The 
Commerce Clause:  Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(2002).  Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 99 (1940) (holding unconstitutional a statute that had 
been applied to ban all picketing without regard to the number of picketers, the peaceful character of the 
picketers, the nature of their dispute with the employer, or the character and the accurateness of the 
message used in notifying the public of the facts of the dispute). 
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orders to prevent and remedy the effects of unfair labor practices.150  Section 10(c) 
provides that, on finding that an employer—or union—has committed an unfair 
labor practice, the Board may direct the violator “to take such affirmative action 
. . . as will effectuate the policies of [the Act].”151  Notwithstanding the “broad” 
remedial language of the NLRA,152 the Supreme Court early on concluded that the 
Board’s remedial authority “does not go so far as to confer a punitive jurisdiction 
enabling the Board to inflict upon the employer any penalty it may choose because 
he is engaged in unfair labor practices, even though the Board be of the opinion 
that the policies of the Act might be effectuated by such an order.”153 
The NLRA’s weakened remedial scheme through judicial amendment has been 
well documented by Professor Ellen Dannin.154  But the courts still characterize 
that authority as “broad” and typically defer to the Board unless it finds that the 
Board has acted in a punitive manner.  Accordingly, one would think that the Board 
would use all of its broad, albeit limited, remedial authority to deter wrongdoers—
employers and unions who engage in unfair labor practices.155  To the contrary, the 
Bush II Board has sought to diminish the already insufficient remedial powers 
afforded by the Act as interpreted.   
For example, the Board has refused to issue a Gissel156 bargaining order—a 
bargaining order issued in cases where an employer engages in pervasive 
misconduct that tends to undermine the union’s majority support, thereby making a 
free and fair election or rerun election unlikely—in cases where employer 
misconduct has been particularly egregious.  In Intermet Stevensville, despite 
noting most of the employer’s numerous unfair labor practices committed during 
and after the election campaign—including removing its bulletin board to prevent 
union use; confiscating union property; interrogating prounion employees; 
restricting timing and movement of prounion workers at the jobsite; unlawfully 
disciplining prounion employees; and unlawfully changing prounion employees 
work schedule—the Board nevertheless reversed the judge’s recommended Gissel 
bargaining order.157  Perhaps from the disenfranchised employees’ point of view, 
the refusal to issue Gissel bargaining orders is nothing new, as the Board has 
                                                                                                     
 150. Hoffman Plastics, 535 U.S. at 142-43. See also Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 898-99.   
 151. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006).   
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2010] LABOR LESSONS 223 
sometimes had trouble enforcing these bargaining orders in court.158  But the sting 
here is that the agency charged with protecting workers’ rights is not even trying to 
issue these orders. 
The Bush II Board also refused to issue a special remedy in a case involving a 
recidivist employer.  In Albertson’s, Inc., the Bush II Board upheld most of the 
judge’s findings that the employer violated the NLRA by refusing to furnish 
information to the employees’ bargaining representatives, but did not agree with 
the judge’s characterization of those violations as “egregious or widespread 
misconduct” sufficient “to demonstrate a general disregard for the employees’ 
fundamental statutory rights,” which would have merited special remedies.159  
Rather, the Board found that the employer’s “failure to respond to the Unions’ 
information requests that were routinely generated in the course of investigating 
and pursuing grievances” were “unlawful and a persistent problem,” but did not 
rise to the level of “egregious or widespread misconduct.”160  The Bush II Board 
further found that the employer’s “information request violations were not so 
numerous, pervasive, and outrageous that special or extraordinary remedies [were] 
needed to dissipate fully the coercive effects of these violations.”161  Accordingly, 
the Bush II Board issued a narrow cease and desist order and a notice posting. 
The Bush II Board also has used procedure to prevent substantive employee 
gains.  In St. George Warehouse, the Bush II Board held that the unlawfully 
discharged employee and the General Counsel, on his or her behalf, now bear the 
burden of coming forward with evidence that the employees took reasonable steps 
to search for work after being fired.162  And in Domsey Trading Corp., the Bush II 
Board reduced the backpay award of workers unlawfully discharged for striking, 
based primarily on the statements or omissions from unsworn compliance forms 
that the General Counsel gives discriminatees for internal purposes, forms used to 
help the Board’s Regional Offices keep track of the discriminatees’ efforts to find 
employment.163  The Board found that these internal records automatically override 
sworn and credited testimony by the discriminatee.164 
Perhaps the most interesting instance where the Bush II Board weakened 
                                                                                                     
 158. Compare Douglas Foods Corp. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1056, 1062, 1065-67 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(refusing to enforce Gissel bargaining order despite upholding the “bulk” of the Board’s unfair labor 
practice findings) with Garvey Marine, Inc. v. NLRB, 245 F.3d 819, 826-29 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding 
Board’s issuance of Gissel bargaining order). 
 159. 351 N.L.R.B. 254, 260 (2007) (quoting Hickmott Foods, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1357, 1357 (1979). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. 351 N.L.R.B. 961, 961 (2007).  Placing such a burden on the discriminatee not only is contrary 
to longstanding Board precedent, NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1317-21 (D. C. Cir. 
1972), but is also contrary to the common law and holdings under various federal employment statutes.  
See, e.g., Grace v. City of Detroit, 216 F. App’x 485, 492 (6th Cir. 2007) (providing that a Title VII 
defendant bears the burden of establishing plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages); Odima v. Westin 
Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1497 (9th Cir. 1995); Robinson v. Transp. Authority, 982 F.2d 892, 898 
(3d Cir. 1993); Edwards v. Sch. Bd., 658 F.2d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1981); DiSalvo v. Chamber of 
Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1978); Sporgis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 517 F.2d 387, 392 (7th 
Cir. 1975).   
 163. 351 N.L.R.B. 824, 844-45 (2007). 
 164. Id. at 844. 
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administrative remedies is provided by Grosvenor Orlando Associates, Ltd.165  
There, the Bush II Board—in the context of evaluating a backpay award to striking 
employees who were lawfully picketing to protest their own unlawful discharge for 
participating in a protected strike—held that those employees were required to 
begin searching for alternative employment within two weeks of their unlawful 
discharge.166  The Board established this requirement even though the employment 
search would require the employees to abandon the very protected activity for 
which they were fired (i.e., participating in the picket line) and an activity which 
the judge determined “constituted a mass application for work.”167  Ostensibly 
applying long-settled principles governing the sufficiency of unlawfully discharged 
employees’ efforts for obtaining interim earnings—which include evaluating the 
backpay period as a whole rather than mechanically dissecting isolated portions of 
that period—the Board concluded that any other result would reward “idleness.”168  
In so concluding, the Board effectively declared “idle” those engaged in the 
fundamental right to strike. 
The significance of this declaration—equating Section 7 activity with 
idleness—is difficult to overstate.   Historically, the idle scrounger is the image 
used by policymakers to withhold benefits from those perceived by some as 
undeserving of our charity.  By equating strikers with the idle, the Board has dealt a 
fundamental blow to the right to strike despite the Act’s plain-language protection 
of that right from “interfere[nce] . . . imped[iment] or diminish[ment] in any 
way.”169  Utilizing the idle scrounger metaphor, the Board in this case conflates the 
strikers’ efforts to secure their old jobs with the inaction of those who refuse to 
work because they are lazy.  This conflation depicts the strikers as unworthy of our 
charity, rather than protecting them from “interfere[nce] . . . imped[iment] or 
diminish[ment]” of their fundamental right to strike.170  More significantly, the 
Board is importing a dubious metaphor into its analysis—one that has its genesis in 
Elizabethan poor laws and that has infiltrated twentieth-century American social 
security laws, including unemployment benefits.171 
Diminishing the remedy also weakens the right to strike by making it a less 
effective weapon in the workers’ arsenal.  Striking employees who have been 
discharged for utilizing a lawful economic weapon must now choose between 
continuing to fight the employer’s unlawful conduct and surrendering to search for 
work.  Surrendering to search for work allows the worker to earn interim earnings 
and reduce the employer’s backpay liability.  The Board, in one fell swoop, has 
effectively mandated that strikers finance the employer’s unlawful activity, a 
burden the Board has refused to place upon employers, and reduced the ability of 
                                                                                                     
 165. 350 N.L.R.B. 1197 (2007). 
 166. Id. at 1199. 
 167. Id. at 1206 (Walsh, dissenting in part). 
 168. Id. at 1199 (majority opinion). 
 169. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006). 
 170. Id. 
 171. For a more thorough discussion of this metaphor, see Anne Marie Lofaso, British and American 
Legal Responses to the Problem of Collective Redundancies (July, 1996) (unpublished D.Phil. dissertation, 
University of Oxford) (on file with author).  See also Lofaso, supra note 92, at 12-13. 
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strikers to communicate their grievance to the general public.172 
The extent of the Board’s willingness to require employees to finance the 
employer’s unlawful conduct is extreme.  In addition to requiring employees to 
attempt to secure interim earnings immediately, the Board further requires those 
employees who find interim employment to seek “‘interim interim’ work while 
waiting for their new jobs to start.”173 
Moreover, considering employment law’s emphasis on worker loyalty, this 
outcome is rather ironic.  After all, it is the strikers who are loyal to the company; 
they choose to air their grievances and seek to change undesirable aspects of their 
organization rather than quit.  Those disloyal to the company are more likely to 
employ an “exit” strategy by seeking alternative employment rather than strike.174  
The Board’s policy of repressing union communication to the consumer promotes 
the flow of labor from one organization to another (i.e., exit) rather than promoting 
change from within (i.e., voice), thereby alienating those loyal employees who 
advocate change.175 
III.  THE EFFECTS OF ADJUDICATIVE DELAY ON INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE176 
The Bush II Board has also been criticized for long delays in issuing orders—a 
criticism that the statistics support.  Of the sixty-one decisions issued in September 
2007, more than half of the cases were pending before the Board for more than four 
years, twenty-one of which had been pending before the Board for more than five 
years.177  But condemning the Board for its administrative sluggishness is hardly 
new.  In the ten years between 1997 and 2007 that I worked for the  Board, I cannot 
recall a single year in which it was not publicly disparaged for delay in case-
processing.  
The recurring problem of delay cannot be placed squarely on the Bush II 
Board, but is, once again, systemic and probably relates to several factors, only 
some of which are endemic to the Board itself.  First, there are typically many 
months, sometimes years, in which the Board is not working at full capacity.  For 
example, since late December 2007, the Board has been functioning with only two 
                                                                                                     
 172. See E.L. Wiegand Div. v. NLRB, 650 F.2d 463, 468 (3d Cir. 1981) (providing that employers 
need not pay striking employees during strike because such activity effectively compels the employer to 
finance the employees’ strike against itself). 
 173. Grosvenor Orlando Assocs., Ltd., 350 N.L.R.B. at 1209 (Walsh, dissenting). 
 174. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:  RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970); RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS 
DO? (1984). 
 175. Anne Marie Lofaso, Workplace Dissent, Democracy, and Justice (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author). 
 176. Sarah Fox first gave me the idea of discussing the problem of delay, which she addressed in her 
presentation to the labor and employment bar at the ABA meeting.  See supra note 9.  
 177. Thirty-three cases were pending before the Board for more than four years.  See, e.g., Domsey 
Trading Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 824 (2007) (involving 202 workers unlawfully discharged during a 1989-
90 organizing campaign at a used clothing facility in Brooklyn, New York; the employer’s anti-union 
campaign involved reprehensible acts of abuse such as physical assault and racial and sexual abuse; the 
back pay award has yet to be issued); D. L. Baker, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 515 (2007); The Earthgrains Co., 
351 N.L.R.B. 733 (2007); Ryder Mem’l Hosp., 351 N.L.R.B. 214 (2007); BP Amoco Chem.-Chocolate 
Bayou, 351 N.L.R.B. 614 (2007); Berthold Nursing Care Ctr., 351 N.L.R.B. 27 (2007). 
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Board members—Member Liebman, a pro-union-leaning Democrat and Member 
Schaumber, a pro-business-leaning Republican.178  Although President Obama has 
nominated three new Board members, Congress has yet to act on those 
nominees.179 Assuming a two-member Board even has authority to issue 
decisions,180 the current Board can only issue decisions if those two members 
agree—an unlikely event in any but the most noncontroversial cases.  In January 
2008—its first full month as a two-member Board—it issued only four 
noncontroversial decisions181 and only three decisions on the merits.182  The 
                                                                                                     
 178. Chairman Battista’s term expired on December 16, 2007; the recess appointments of Members 
Walsh and Kirsanow expired at the sine die adjournment of Congress in January.  Press Release, N.L.R.B., 
Labor Board Temporarily Delegates Litigation Authority to General Counsel; Will Issue Decisions with 
Two Members After Members Kirsanow and Walsh Depart (Dec. 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/news_room/template_html.aspx?file=http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Pr
ess%20Releases/2007/R-2653.htm.    
 179. The two Democratic nominees are Craig Becker and Mark Gaston Pearce; the Republican 
nominee is Brian Hayes.  Press Release, N.L.R.B., White House Announces Three NLRB Nominations, 
July 10, 2009, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Press%20Releases/2009/B071009.pdf.  At 
the time this Article went to press, Senator John McCain had delayed confirmation of the three-person 
package based on opposition to Craig Becker’s nomination. See Steve Greenhouse, Labor Panel Is 
Stalled by Dispute on Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010 at A1b, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2010/01/15/us/politics/15nlrb.html. 
 180. The Board claims that it has authority to delegate authority to a two-member Board under 
Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006).  See, e.g., 
Aluminum Casting & Eng’g Co., 352 N.L.R.B. 1, n.7 (2008) (explaining that the two-member Board 
that decided that decision properly constituted a quorum under Section 3(b)).  But the Board’s reading 
of Section 3(b) is not without controversy.  See Laurel Baye Healthcare, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 
472-76 (D.C. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 186 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2417 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2009) (No. 
09-377) (rejecting the Board’s interpretation of Section 3(b)’s quorum requirements and concluding that 
the Board is without such authority).  Section 3(b) states that “two members shall constitute a quorum of 
any group designated pursuant to the first sentence,” which “authorize[s the Board] to delegate to any 
group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise.”  29 U.S.C. § 
153(b) (2006).  The Board’s decision to delegate its authority to the remaining two members presents a 
strained reading of Section 3(b), but at least some reviewing courts have accepted the Board’s 
interpretation as reasonable.  See Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 414-24 (2d Cir. 2009); 
New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 845-48 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 
3670, 78 U.S.L.W. 3012, 78 U.S.L.W. 3245, 78 U.S.L.W. 3251 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457); 
Northeastern Land Services, Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 40-42 (1st Cir. 2009).   
 181. See Aluminum Casting, 352 N.L.R.B. at 1 (granting General Counsel’s motion for summary 
judgment awarding back pay in amount stipulated by the parties); Mason Tenders Local #388, 352 
N.L.R.B. No. 2, No. 5-CB-10112 (NLRB Jan. 23, 2008) (granting General Counsel’s motion for 
summary judgment ordering employer to comply with an informal Board settlement agreement); 
Countrywide Landfill, 352 N.L.R.B. No. 3, No. 7-CA-49546 (NLRB Jan. 24, 2008) (granting General 
Counsel’s motion for default judgment where employer withdrew answer);  HWH Trading Corp., 352 
N.L.R.B. No. 4, No. 29-CA-28419 (NLRB Jan. 25, 2008) (granting General Counsel’s motion for 
default judgment where employer failed to file an answer). 
 182. See Kingsbridge Heights Rehab. Care Ctr., 352 N.L.R.B. 6 (2008) (adopting without discussion 
judge’s conclusion that employer violated the Act by surveilling employees’ union activities and 
threatening to delay reinstatement of employees upon unconditional surrender to return to work); Int’l 
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Moving Picture Operators, Local 720, 352 N.L.R.B. 29 
(2008) (second supplemental decision and order) (amending remedy issued in supplemental decision 
and order issued in 2004); Biosource Landscaping Servs., LLC, 352 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (2008) (adopting 
without discussion judge’s conclusion that employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening employees 
with plant closure if they voted for a union and informing employees that it would be futile for 
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following month, the Board issued an additional nineteen decisions—in two of 
which the Board granted motions for default judgment,183 in another two of which 
the Board made decisions regarding jurisdictional disputes,184 in eight of which the 
Board adopted the judge’s decision with little or no discussion,185 and in only seven 
of which the Board discussed the merits.186 
Along these lines, to the extent that the two Board members have been able to 
agree and issue decisions, the fact that the United States Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit in Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB has 
concluded that the Board is without authority to issue those decisions is 
significant.187  The NLRA permits “[a]ny person aggrieved by a final order of the 
Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought [to] obtain a review 
of such order . . . in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia.”188  Accordingly, the losing parties in final decisions issued between 
December 2007 and the time that the full Board is appointed are within their right 
to petition for review in the D.C. Circuit, which has thus far refused to enforce the 
Board’s “invalid” order.189  If the Board ultimately loses this issue in the Supreme 
Court—then most of the two-member Board’s work of the last two years will be 
lost. 
Second, the procedural requirements of cases under the Board’s jurisdiction, 
like those of most cases under the exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative 
                                                                                                     
employees to choose a union because it would not permit a union; and issuing cease-and-desist order 
and notice posting). 
 183. See Proper Steel Erectors, Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 74 (2008) (failure to file answer to amended 
compliance specification); Publ’n Printing Co., 352 N.L.R.B. No. 12, No. 14-CA-29046 (NLRB 
February 11, 2008) (failure to file answer). 
 184. See Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, Local 10, 352 N.L.R.B. 162 (2008); Bldg., Concrete, 
Excavating & Common Laborers Union, Local 731, 352 N.L.R.B. 107 (2008). 
 185. See North Am. Linen, LLC, 352 N.L.R.B. 167 (2008); Clarke Mfg., Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 141 
(2008); Found. Coal W., Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 147 (2008); Valley Health Sys., LLC, 352 N.L.R.B. 112 
(2008); Nat’l Broad. Co., 352 N.L.R.B. 90 (2008); Stepan Co., 352 N.L.R.B. 79 (2008); Windstream 
Corp., 352 N.L.R.B. 44 (2008); Laborer’s Int’l Union, Local Union No. 169, 352 N.L.R.B. 33 (2008). 
 186. See Leiferman Enters, LLC, 352 N.L.R.B. 152 (2008); Aircraft Servs. Int’l, Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 
137 (2008); Cardinal Health Care, Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 104 (2008); Ralphs Grocery Co., 352 N.L.R.B. 
128 (2008); Lorge Sch., 352 N.L.R.B. 119 (2008); Smith Indus. Maint. Corp., 352 N.L.R.B. No. 13 
(February 14, 2008); Hercules Drawn Steel Corp., 352 N.L.R.B. 53 (2008). 
 187. See Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 472-76 (D.C. Cir. 
2009), petition for cert. filed, 186 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2417 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2009) (No. 09-377) (rejecting 
the Board’s interpretation of Section 3(b)’s quorum requirements and concluding that the Board is 
without such authority).   
 188. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2006). 
 189. The current Board has continued to issue decisions, notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit’s decision 
in Laurel Baye. In protest of that decision, the Board filed a petition for rehearing en banc in that case.  
See Petition for Rehearing, Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009), Nos. 08-1162 & 08-1214 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 2009), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/nlrb-petition.pdf.  The Court has denied that petition.  See Laurel 
Baye, 564 F.3d at 469.  The Board has recently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United 
States Supreme Court.  See Brief of NLRB, NLRB v. Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc., 
Docket No. 09-377, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2009/2pet/7pet/2009-0377. pet.aa. 
html.  The Supreme Court will consider this issue.  See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 
(7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3670, 78 U.S.L.W. 3012, 78 U.S.L.W. 3245, 78 U.S.L.W. 
3251 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 08-1457). 
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agency, facilitate delay through the administrative review procedure.  Although 
cases might theoretically move through the Board quickly—from charge, to 
complaint, to hearing, to administrative law judge’s recommended decision, to 
Board decision and final order—cases potentially slow down at the court review 
stage.  At this stage, cases are often remanded to provide additional Board findings 
of fact or better explanations for the Board’s legal conclusion. 
Third, the Board is supposed to make policy through adjudication.190  Coupling 
this congressional charge with the political composition of the Board has created a 
recipe for juridical disaster.  Board members often come to the NLRB with specific 
political agendas.  In controversial areas, such as the question whether nonunion 
employees may request a witness during a disciplinary interview, the Board has 
flipped its policy several times.191 This flipping is known as “oscillation.”  The 
policy of oscillation, which is a perfectly legal course for an administrative agency 
to follow, has several negative consequences for those affected by the NLRA.192  
Most obviously, the policy of oscillation destabilizes the law.  This is a particularly 
bad consequence for those employers, employees, and unions under the jurisdiction 
of the NLRA, which Congress enacted to stabilize industrial relations.  
Some scholars have argued that one way around this problem is for the Board 
to embrace rulemaking.193  While I am sympathetic to this course of action, at least 
two scholars have argued that the Board is without authority to engage in 
substantive rulemaking.194 
Fourth, because one Board may not be able to issue a case before a new Board 
comes in, cases are often left in limbo as the composition of the Board changes.  
More precisely, as administrations change, new Board members come to the Board, 
often with new policy agendas.  Every change in administration renews the 
opportunity for oscillation.  While there may be some good reasons to support a 
policy of oscillation (e.g., that oscillation shows responsiveness to the majority 
                                                                                                     
 190. Many scholars have argued that courts also make policy.  This may be true, but not to the extent 
of an administrative agency that is charged with making national policy on specific subject matter.  As 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained:  “Because it is to the Board that Congress entrusted the 
task of ‘applying the [NLRA]'s general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of 
events which might be charged as violative of its terms,’ that body, if it is to accomplish the task which 
Congress set for it, necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of the broad 
statutory provisions.”  Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. at 500-01 (citation omitted) (quoting Republic 
Aviation, 324 U.S. at 798); accord NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990). 
 191. In IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004), the Bush II Board reversed Epilepsy Foundation, 331 
N.L.R.B. at 676, a case where the Board applied the principles of J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, to a 
“nonunionized [setting] . . . permitting an employee] the right to have a coworker present at an 
investigatory interview which the employee reasonably believed might result in disciplinary action.” 
 192. For an excellent critique of the Board’s policy of oscillation, see Samuel Estreicher, Policy 
Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163 (1985). 
 193. See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 132, at 2016 n.12. 
 194. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:  The 
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 510-11 (2002). See also id. at 565-70 (arguing that, 
contrary to the views of Judge Friendly and other scholars, subsequent amendments to the NLRA did 
not alter the original limitation on the scope of the Board's rulemaking authority).  This issue was not 
raised in Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. 606.  See Merril & Watts, supra note 194, at 56 (“The Association 
did not raise the more fundamental question whether the NLRB possessed legislative rulemaking 
authority in the first place. Rather, the parties, the Seventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court all assumed 
that Congress had given the NLRB the power to promulgate legislative rules.”). 
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will) the consequence for the particular parties to a dispute is uncertainty.  The 
burden of delay is rarely spread evenly over all parties under the NLRA’s 
jurisdiction (i.e., employers, employees, and unions).  Rather, employees and 
unions working on behalf of employee rights bear the greater burden of delay 
because it is their rights that are being delayed.  To be sure, employers will 
complain that delay affects them as well.  But while an employer can protect itself 
against backpay remedies by putting aside damage awards lest the Board finds that 
the employer engaged in unlawful conduct, it is often difficult to remedy employee 
rights that are not immediately remedied, such as the denial of employment through 
unjust termination or the denial of representation through employer unfair labor 
practices that interfere with free and fair elections or the denial of a first contract 
because of an employer’s unlawful refusal to bargain.  And although there are 
means for expedited review, federal courts contribute to this problem to the extent 
that court review of final Board decisions typically takes more than a year. 
IV.  DANA CORPORATION: THE “MASSACRE” IN THE SEPTEMBER MASSACRE? 
Several of the Bush II Board’s recent decisions show its predilection not only 
for making unionization more difficult but also for making decertification easier.  
This hard-in/easy-out approach further frustrates the NLRA’s main policy of 
promoting industrial peace and stability through the process of collective 
bargaining.195 
A.  The Bush II Board’s Decision To Undermine Voluntary Recognition 
In keeping with a hard-in theme, the Bush II Board changed its rules governing 
voluntary recognition.  Until recently, a union receiving voluntary recognition from 
an employer enjoyed an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for a 
reasonable period of time to enable the parties to reach agreement on a first 
contract.196  That changed in Dana Corp., where the Board removed this “voluntary 
recognition bar [to decertification]” for the first forty-five days following employer 
recognition.197  The Board’s new rule also requires employers and unions to notify 
employees of their newly minted right to file a decertification petition or election 
petition within forty-five days of receiving notice that their employer has 
recognized the union under a neutrality or card-check agreement.198  Under the new 
                                                                                                     
 195. The NLRA’s policy of industrial peace and stability cannot be overstated.  During the 1960s, the 
Supreme Court felt so strongly about this underlying policy that it was willing to waive a union’s 
statutorily protected right to strike in cases where the union had agreed to a grievance-arbitration 
proceeding.  Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). 
 196. Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966). 
 197. 351 N.L.R.B. at 434. 
 198. During the 2007 ABA Labor and Employment Law meeting, former Board Member Sarah M. 
Fox pointed out that this is the first time in the Board’s history that the Board has required employers 
who have not violated the law to post an official government notice in the workplace advising 
employees of their rights under the Act.  She noted that the only right mentioned in those notices is the 
right of those who wish to decertify—not the right of the majority that wants the union to represent its 
interests for purposes of collective bargaining.  See supra note 9.  The only Board notice to come close 
to such a requirement is the Board’s Notice of Election, which requires employers to notify workers of 
balloting details through a notice posting three days before a Board-conducted election.  See Notice of 
230 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
rules, a recognition bar is erected only if “45 days pass from the date of notice 
without the filing of a valid petition.”199   
In recent years, voluntary recognition has served as an alternative for unions 
frustrated with the Board’s election rules, which have given employers advantages 
such as captive-audience speeches.  The Board’s modified approach diminishes the 
value of that alternative and assaults the principle of majority rule: a decertification 
petition supported by thirty percent of the employees trumps a card-check 
agreement supported by seventy percent of the employees, thereby forcing an 
election. 
B.  The Significance of Dana Corporation 
Until Dana Corp., there was very little erosion of the Board’s longstanding 
approach to voluntary recognition.  Dana Corp. stands as perhaps the most 
revolutionary decision of the September Massacre for two reasons.  First, Dana 
Corp.’s new voluntary recognition rules are themselves revolutionary.  As former 
NLRB Board Member Sarah Fox recently pointed out, the rules mark the first time 
the Board requires a nonremedial posting.200  Second, and more significantly, Dana 
Corp. highlights the cumulative effect of the Bush II Board’s hostility to unions.  
The Dana Corp. rules, combined with the Babcock/Lechmere doctrine excluding 
non-employees from organizing on employers’ private property and the Bush II 
Board’s new approach to salts, undoubtedly make it significantly harder to organize 
the workplace.  In that sense, Dana Corp. symbolizes the Bush II Board’s vigorous 
resistance to union organization and signals a new era of government repression of 
unionization.201 
V.  CONCLUSION:  ADVICE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 
This Article provides an initial review of some of the Bush II Board’s 
decisions, with special focus on its September 2007 decisions, and their place in 
labor history.  Much more analysis must be done to determine the actual deleterious 
effects of the Bush II Board’s actions on the rights of the working class.  Perhaps a 
little more time—and court review—is needed to determine whether the Bush II 
Board’s most recent assault on those rights is a massacre, part of a slow erosion of 
those rights by all branches of government, or both.202   
                                                                                                     
Election, CASEHANDLING MANUAL § 11314, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/ 
CHMII/Sections11300-11350.pdf.  Notably, the Beck notice instituted by President Bush through an 
Executive Order was not a Board-required notice.  See Exec. Order No. 13201, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,221 
(Feb. 17, 2001), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13496, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,107 (Jan. 30, 2009).   
 199. See Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 434. 
 200. See supra note 9. 
 201. The early Bush II Board laid the foundation for cutting back on representational rights by 
making it difficult for unions to retain representation in the successorship context when it reversed 
precedent providing for a successor bar:  “[T]he preclusion of petitions challenging the union’s majority 
status for a reasonable period after a successor employer’s obligation to recognize an incumbent union is 
triggered.”  St. Elizabeth Manor, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 341, 344 (1999), overruled by MV Transp., 337 
N.L.R.B. 770, 770 (2002). 
 202. But see Guard Publ’g, 591 F.3d 53, (denying enforcement to one of the Bush II Board’s most 
controversial decisions, Republican Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110). 
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Whatever the complete analysis shows, it surely will show this:  The 
September Massacre reveals a Board willing to erode the protections provided for 
workers using the very law that was intended to safeguard those protections.  In the 
wake of Lechmere, salts became an effective organizing tool for unions.  When the 
Supreme Court affirmed that union tactic, the Bush II Board stepped in to weaken 
it.  Voluntary recognition is claimed by unions to be an effective organizing tool—
a way that unions could avoid repressive employer tactics, such as captive audience 
speeches and administrative delay.  So, the Bush II Board stepped in and repressed 
that union tactic as well. 
One obvious cure for the damage wrought by the September Massacre is, of 
course, a new presidential administration.  Oscillation of NLRA policies is a part of 
our national labor policy.203  An Obama Board with a pro-law-enforcement 
majority is likely to reverse much of this precedent.  But there are many problems 
with the Board’s penchant for oscillation.  Even if oscillation does reflect the 
majority will, oscillation takes time and creates unpredictability in the law.  In any 
event, if the September Massacre is, to a large extent, part of a greater trend toward 
chipping away at the Board’s unique protections for workers, a change in 
administration may not be enough.  Instead, fundamental reform that also provides 
certainty in the law is needed.  
First, the members of the Obama Board must be willing to enforce the NLRA 
and promote the policies underlying the Act, policies which include “encouraging 
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.”204  But, as explained 
immediately above, that strategy is helpful only if the President appoints a pro-law-
enforcement Board.  And given the political nature of labor law and the Board’s 
penchant for oscillation, these results are likely to be short-lived.  Accordingly, at 
least with regard to some of the more political issues that have dominated the 
Board’s adjudicatory process in the past thirty years, the Obama Board should 
reverse the Bush II Board’s most egregious precedents both by adjudication and 
then by rulemaking.205 
The Obama Board should overturn the economic test for employee status—
whether the relationship between the worker and the employer is “predominantly . . 
. economic in nature”206—and return to a case-by-case evaluation.  In such 
evaluations, the Board would presume employee status based on record evidence of 
employment; the party asserting nonemployee status could rebut that presumption 
by producing evidence and persuading the Board that the worker meets the 
definition of one of the enumerated exemptions, such as supervisor.207  When 
overruling this test, the Board should also expressly overrule Toering Electric, 
                                                                                                     
 203. Estreicher, supra note 192, at 175-77 (advocating the use of rulemaking to overturn prior 
precedent to make oscillation more difficult). 
 204. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 205. But see Merrill & Watts, supra note 194, at 510-11 (discussing the potential obstacles to NLRB 
rulemaking). 
 206. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (quoting St. Clare’s Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002 (1977)); 
accord Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 982 (2004). 
 207. See Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. at 710-11 (holding that it is a reasonable construction of the 
NLRA to place the burden of proving supervisory status on the party claiming that the worker is a 
supervisor). 
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Brown University, Brevard Achievement Center, and St. Clare’s Hospital.   
Moreover, case-by-case adjudication of employee status is likely to conserve 
administrative resources because only those cases where there is a genuine dispute 
in status are likely to be litigated.  In so doing, the Board can avoid the unintended 
consequences of broad rulemaking, which often results in adjudicatory 
backtracking and messy case law that is difficult to enforce in the courts of appeals. 
The Obama Board should also expressly overrule several other cases discussed 
in this Article.  For example, the Board should expressly overrule Oil Capitol208 
and return to the remedial structure for salts that the courts of appeals had 
accepted.209  The Obama Board should also review its equipment-and-bulletin-
board line of cases in the context of union solicitation and make reasoned 
judgments about whether use of a particular piece of equipment really implicates 
the employer’s property or managerial interests.210   
The Obama Board should also extend Weingarten rights to nonunion 
employees in the organized workplace.  The right to representation, especially 
during an investigatory meeting that is reasonably likely to result in discipline, is a 
core Section 7 right under the mutual aid or protection clause that all statutory 
employees hold, regardless of whether those employees are actually represented by 
a union.  In extending these rights to nonunion employees, the Board must 
expressly overrule IBM Corp.211 
In response to the unpredictability that results from oscillation, the Obama 
Board should consider making these changes more permanent by engaging in 
rulemaking.  To get around the problem raised by Professor Merrill,212 Congress 
should amend the NLRA to expressly authorize the Board to engage in substantive 
rulemaking and to make court challenges to rules directly appealable to the courts 
of appeals.213 
Second, Congress must be willing to enact legislative changes, both 
substantive and procedural, to the NLRA.  Unfortunately, as this Article shows, 
congressional change has been predominantly harmful to unions.  Any proposed 
amendment—even a pro-worker amendment—presents the risk that the legislation 
will include anti-worker provisions.214  Notwithstanding this risk, labor currently 
backs several legislative amendments to the NLRA.  The most likely candidates at 
this point are an act entitled the Re-Empowerment of Skilled and Professional 
                                                                                                     
 208. 349 N.L.R.B.  118. 
 209. See, e.g., Ferguson Elec., 242 F.3d at 436. 
 210. In examining these issues, the Obama Board could start with Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon 
Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 262 (2008).  The Board should also 
examine Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1353 (2003) (examining the marginal cost of 
transmitting e-mail messages). 
 211. See IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288. 
 212. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 194, at 569 (raising the question of whether the NLRB 
possesses legislative rulemaking authority). 
 213. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 608-09 (challenge to rule went first to the district court 
and then to the court of appeals). 
 214. For that and other reasons, I support eliminating the supervisory exemption altogether.  But that 
discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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Employees and Construction Tradeworkers (RESPECT)215 and the Employee Free 
Choice Act (EFCA).216   
RESPECT would have the immediate effect of overruling the Board’s recent 
Oakwood Trilogy by narrowing the definition of supervisor in two ways.  First, the 
Act would remove the authority to assign and to responsibly direct other employees 
as conditions for finding supervisory status.  Second, the Act would require 
workers to possess supervisory authority over employees for a majority of that 
worker’s work time, thereby reversing the Board’s policy of finding supervisory 
status and exempting those workers from the NLRA’s protection, in cases where 
employees exercise one of the twelve enumerated powers in as little as 10 percent 
of their work time.   
The question whether RESPECT is likely to empower workers depends in part 
on the type of litigation that could arise from its enactment.  RESPECT would 
obviously spark litigation over the extent to which a worker’s time is spent 
discharging supervisory powers.  What is less obvious is that RESPECT is also 
likely to spark litigation over the putative supervisor’s other powers, especially 
disciplinary power and the power to “effectively to recommend such action.”  By 
eliminating the powers to assign and responsibly to direct from the twelve 
enumerated powers, and by retaining the authority to “hire, transfer, suspend, 
lay off, recall, promote, discharge, . . . reward, . . . discipline . . . or to adjust 
[employee] grievances,”217 RESPECT essentially limits the supervisory exemption 
to those employees who have authority over other employees where authority 
entails one person’s actual power over another person.  While, from the employee’s 
perspective, this seems like the right move, such legislation may very well backfire 
if courts misunderstand the significance of the amendment and begin to find that 
workers hold the power to discipline in cases where there is very little authority, 
such as in cases where workers are merely reporting work transgressions to true 
supervisors and managers.218  
EFCA, as it is popularly known, is currently the more controversial of the two 
legislatives bills.  EFCA currently has three main mandates.219  First, it requires the 
Board to investigate, and if appropriate, certify unions when a majority of 
employees have signed authorization cards.220  Second, it guarantees a contract for 
                                                                                                     
 215. H.R. 1644, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext. 
xpd?bill=h110-1644. 
 216. H.R. 1409, 111th  Cong. (2009), (reintroduced March 10, 2009), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.1409. 
 217. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006). 
 218. Compare Hosp. Gen. Menonita v. NLRB, 393 F.3d 263, 267-68 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that 
evidence is insufficient to demonstrate supervisory status “where an employee’s involvement in the 
evaluation process is merely reportorial in nature”) with NLRB v. Quinnipiac Coll., 256 F.3d 68, 76-77 
(2d Cir. 2001) (overturning Board finding and holding that evidence is sufficient to demonstrate 
supervisory status where employees “have the discretion whether to report an individual for disciplinary 
infractions”). 
 219. See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th  Cong. (2009), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.1409 (reintroduced March 10, 2009).  See generally 
AFL-CIO, SUMMARY OF EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT (2009), at http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/ 
voiceatwork/efca/upload/EFCA_Summary.pdf. 
 220. See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, supra note 219, § 2.  
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workers represented by a newly certified union by mandating binding arbitration 
after ninety days of bargaining in first contract situations.221  Third, it strengthens 
remedies by authorizing the Board to order civil penalties against employers who 
willfully or repeatedly violate the Act; requiring employers to pay treble backpay 
damages to remedy unlawful discharges; and mandating injunctive relief in cases 
of discharge, significant interference with employee rights during elections, and 
first contract bargaining.222 
Although many news agencies are reporting the demise of EFCA’s card check 
requirements,223 it remains worthwhile to analyze this most controversial aspect of 
EFCA for two reasons.  First, the card check represents the business community’s 
most disingenuous attack on employee self-organization.  Second, news agencies 
have been reporting the death of card check for many years but it apparently 
continues to resurrect itself.  As with RESPECT, the question whether EFCA is 
likely to empower workers depends on how EFCA is interpreted by the Board and 
reviewing courts.  Notwithstanding employer protestations that EFCA would make 
it significantly easier for unions to organize employees and is therefore 
counterproductive in today’s economic recession, EFCA leaves much room for 
Board interpretation, which means that there is plenty of room for the Board to 
circumscribe what appears to be a pro-union bill.   
In particular, EFCA requires the Board to “develop guidelines and procedures 
for the designation by employees of a bargaining representative” in “find[ing] that 
a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for bargaining has signed valid 
authorizations designating [their representative].”224  For example, in the election 
context, where the Board is asked to determine whether a particular union ever 
enjoyed a card majority for purposes of determining whether to issue a Gissel 
bargaining order, the Board has well-developed, court-approved, case law for 
authenticating authorization cards.  Under these rules, the Board applies the 
Cumberland Shoe doctrine:   
[I]f the card itself is unambiguous (i.e., states on its face that the signer authorizes 
the Union to represent the employee for collective bargaining purposes and not to 
seek an election), it will be counted unless it is proved that the employee was told 
that the card was to be used solely for the purpose of obtaining an election.225   
The Board also requires authentication of signatures, often by comparing signatures 
to payroll records.   
When confronted with a union that demands Board certification upon a 
showing of a majority of authorization cards, the Board, at the very least, is likely 
to borrow from this case law.  But it is also likely that such case law would merely 
signal a starting point.  The Board, especially some future pro-business Board, 
could certainly develop rules that would create additional obstacles before 
                                                                                                     
 221. See id. § 3. 
 222. See id. § 4. 
 223. See The New Old ‘Card Check,’ WALL ST. J., July 21, 2009, at A11, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124804413309863431.html. 
 224. See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, supra note 219, § 7. 
 225. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 584 (internal citations omitted) (citing Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 
N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963)); and Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N.LR.B. No. 57 (1968)). 
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authenticating cards in the name of protecting the integrity of the Board’s 
processes.  
If labor loses EFCA’s card check provision, it will need to put something in its 
place that promotes self-organization.  As many scholars have pointed out, unions 
often support voluntary recognition because employers have figured out that if they 
give five captive audience speeches226 over approximately five weeks, the 
employer can chip away at the union’s majority to such an extent that it will lose 
the election.227  To fix this problem, Congress could require the Board to hold 
secret-ballot elections within two weeks of filing a petition for election.228  This 
permits the employer to give its side of the story without allowing so much time to 
run that employers can scare employees, who really want a union, out of voting for 
the union. 
Third, courts must be willing both to defer to Board decisions in the 
appropriate circumstances and to reverse the Board when it acts to repress union 
organizing and collective bargaining in contravention of the NLRA’s express 
protections.  This point is complex.  As a threshold matter, if a Board hostile to 
workers’ Section 7 rights is clever, it can escape judicial review by chipping away 
at those rights through adjudication and then using its own precedent to further 
erode those rights guaranteed by the NLRA.  Federal courts decide individual cases 
and controversies; courts reviewing the adjudicated decisions of administrative 
agencies have a much smaller policymaking role than courts reviewing cases 
involving other federal questions.  Given judicial deference to administrative 
decisions in the form of Chevron and Universal Camera deference, reviewing 
courts may feel hamstrung to do much about such decisions.     
Reviewing courts must also restrain themselves from taking out their 
frustration with the Board’s administrative delay on discriminatees and other 
victims of unfair labor practices by refusing to enforce Board orders issued on stale 
                                                                                                     
 226. Under the Board’s current policy, employers may hold meetings during paid work hours to 
inform employees of the disadvantages of union membership and to encourage them to vote against the 
union in the upcoming election so long as speeches are noncoercive.  Nor must employers give unions 
access to their premises to give pro-union election speeches.  See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 
400, 406-07 (1953).  There are two main limitations on employers’ privilege to speak to their 
employees.  First, those speeches cannot be coercive.  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).  Second, 
employers may not give captive audiences speeches within twenty-four hours of an election.  Peerless 
Plywood, 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953) (prohibiting employers and unions “from making elections 
speeches on company time to massed assemblies of employees within 24 hours before the scheduled 
time for conducting an election”). 
 227. See, e.g., DONALD P. WILSON, TOTAL VICTORY!  THE COMPLETE MANAGEMENT GUIDE TO A 
SUCCESSFUL NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTION CAMPAIGN 164 (1994).  Wilson presents data that 
management has a 92.7% chance of defeating the union in the representation election if it requires its 
employees to attend five or more captive audience speeches.  Id. 
 228. See, e.g., William B. Gould, What Would Employee Free Choice Mean in the Workplace, 58th 
Annual Conference of Labor Relations Agencies: Labor Management Relations and the Global 
Economic Crisis (July 20, 2009),  available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/ 
publications_pdf/Gould%20July%2020%20Speech%20to%20ALRA1.pdf (advocating, among other 
things, expedited elections).  Although some may suggest that Gould’s cure (i.e., expedited elections) is 
worse than the disease (i.e., broken elections), I disagree.  To be sure, employers will retain the right to 
challenge elections, which means that some elections will be overturned on the back-end of an expedited 
election process.  But many other elections will not be overturned.   
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cases.  Courts could instead hold the Board accountable by compelling it to issue 
decisions in cases where charging parties bring the Board’s delay to the courts’ 
attention by petitioning the court for a writ of mandamus.229 
Fourth, labor advocates must be willing to use what is left of the NLRA to 
push forward a pro-union agenda.230  But labor advocates are wary of such an 
approach.  If anything, labor advocates are often persuaded by the arguments of the 
legal abstentionists231 and have nearly abandoned the NLRA.  That would be an 
effective strategy if the NLRA did not have primary and often exclusive 
jurisdiction over labor-management disputes.232  But because the Board may 
regulate labor-management relations, and often may preempt others from 
regulating those relationships, an anti-union Board can create rules that force the 
parties to use its processes and then stack those rules in favor of de-collectivization.  
Such is the legacy of Dana Corp.   
Fifth, labor must understand that it is losing the media war.  Images of “big 
labor” and labor bosses—often combined with derogatory images of Italian-
Americans to evoke Mafia-controlled, corrupt workplaces—dominate the mass 
media.233  And notwithstanding the fact that unions today are entitled to voluntary 
recognition without a Board-conducted secret-ballot election, the main thrust of the 
anti-EFCA campaign concerns the “loss” of a fundamental right to an election.  
Labor must be willing to reinvent itself by sending the message that unions have 
essentially created the floor of rights upon which Americans work—a message that 
would find a more receptive audience if students were required to study labor 
history in public school.234  Some groups are already starting to educate the public, 
                                                                                                     
 229. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (authorizing federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law”).  
See, e.g., NLRB v. Long Island Coll. Hosp., 20 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting the denial of 
mandamus notwithstanding years of delay prior to the Board’s issuance of a final agency decision).   
 230. For a discussion of how this might be done, see DANNIN, supra note 6. 
 231. “Collective laissez-faire” or legal abstentionism is the theory that employees’ rights are best 
protected by respecting freedom of contract with as little state support or legal intervention as possible.  
Adherents of that theory believed that government regulation of labor relations—even policies of 
recognition—could hurt labor in the long run by re-subjecting unions to judicial repression of legally 
gained rights.  Under that view, subjecting unions to legal regulation made it possible for judges, who 
come predominantly from the property owning and capitalist class, to cut back on rights gained through 
the legal process.  It was thought that cut backs were less likely to occur where unions were given 
regulatory immunity—permitted to wield their economic power without being subject to legal 
regulation.  Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, the Austrian-born professor of comparative law at Oxford, is usually 
credited with developing the theory of collective laissez-faire and applying that theory to British labor 
relations.  See O. Kahn-Freund, Legal Framework, in THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
GREAT BRITAIN (Allan Flanders & H.A. Clegg, eds.).  For an excellent discussion of legal absentionism, 
see Sandra Fredman, The New Rights: Labour Law and Ideology in the Thatcher Years, 12 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 24, 39-42 (1992). 
 232. For a discussion of three examples where this has been effective, see Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor 
Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375 (2007). 
 233. See, e.g., Union Violence Meets the Sopranos, http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=APzu9zX4mBA (last visited Oct. 2, 2009). 
 234. California Education Code § 51009.  See Wisconsin Senate Bill 135/Assembly Bill 172, 
available at http://nxt.legis.state.wi.us/nxt/gateway.dll/Session%20Related/bills09/12125/12126?f= 
templates$fn=document-frameset.htm$q=[field folio-destination-name:'sb135']$x=Advanced#0-0-0-
269521. 
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but greater effort is needed.235   
Accordingly, labor must recognize that it needs to utilize a Sun Tzu strategy.236  
Much can be said on this strategy but let me at least begin the conversation.  Labor 
first needs to understand that business interests have the upper hand.  Labor must 
take evasive action and not hit big business head-on.237  Along these lines, labor 
needs to get a message across to consumers that it is not interested in destroying 
corporate America but in making it better by improving the lives of workers.238  
For example, labor should promote universal health care as both a civil rights 
message—all workers are entitled to healthcare—and as an economic message—
American companies can compete more effectively on the global market if the 
financial burden of healthcare was not placed on them. 
Conversely, labor needs to counterattack big business’s current Sun Tzu 
strategy of deception.239  For example, very few Americans understand that EFCA 
does not take away workers’ right to an election.  Rather, it takes away the 
employer’s right to insist on an election, notwithstanding a union’s showing of 
majority support in the form of card check; 240 yet business has been very effective 
in bringing that fallacious message across, so much so that many feel that the card 
check is now a lost battle.241  Labor can counter this message in part by educating 
consumers about the role that business plays in repressing workers rights at the 
workplace.   
Another very effective, time-tested method of winning this war is through 
what labor does best—grassroots organizing.  Labor has already begun doing this 
through Working America.242  Once again, this is a Sun Tzu strategy because it 
employs a strategy of winning over consumers and producers without fighting.  But 
to be effective, labor must integrate with other grassroots communities into a 
workplace-community.243  For example, labor should integrate with environmental 
groups to push for blue-green jobs.244  Labor should also integrate with civil rights 
groups to push for social reforms that would help the working classes, whose 
                                                                                                     
 235. See, e.g., What Have the Unions Ever Done for Us?, http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=184NTV2CE_c (last visited Oct. 2, 2009). 
 236. See generally SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR (Lionel Giles trans., 1910). 
 237. “If he is in superior strength, evade him.”  Id. § 1, ¶ 21. 
 238. Id. § 3, ¶ 1 (arguing in favor of taking “the enemy’s country whole and intact” rather than “to 
shatter and destroy it”). 
 239. “All warfare is based on deception.”  Id. § 1, ¶ 18. 
 240. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 302, 306-10 (1974) (reversing the 
NLRB’s decision and holding that an employer does not violate Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA by 
refusing to recognize a union supported by a majority of valid authority cards and further holding that in 
such cases the union has the burden of filing the election petition). 
 241. “When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men’s weapons will 
grow dull and their ardor will be damped.  If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.”  
SUN TZU supra note 236, § 2, ¶ 2. Id. at § 2, ¶ 2.  By currently winning this media war, business has 
made labor fight a battle they had already lost. 
 242. See Working America,  http://www.workingamerica.org (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).   
 243. See FLETCHER & GAPASIN, supra note 7, at 174.  
 244. The BlueGreen Alliance, a national partnership between unions and environmental 
organizations, is an example of such a community that is “dedicated to expanding the number and 
quality of jobs in the green economy.”  BlueGreen Alliance, http://www.bluegreenalliance.org (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2009).  
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members include a disproportionate percentage of minorities.245  This means that 
labor should also act on the understanding that unions must not restrict themselves 
to the workplace because class struggle is not restricted to the workplace.246  And 
labor unions should embrace globalization by taking advantage of cross-border 
opportunities to organize.247  Some, like the United Steelworkers and the UK’s 
largest union, Unite, have already begun this process.248 
Sixth, academics must be willing to teach and write about labor law so that 
when these branches of government and private advocates are ready and willing to 
effect change they can draw upon a coherent, well-developed set of ideas.249  
Unfortunately, labor programs in law schools are dwindling.  Many law schools no 
longer teach labor law as a separate course, if at all.  And the less labor law is 
taught, the less likely law professors will write in the area.  Labor law professors 
must convince their deans—and the law school’s constituents—that teaching labor 
law is important.  And if they are already teaching labor law, professors must 
convince their students of the importance of labor law so that they will take the 
course and be able to recognize labor law issues as they arise in practice.  Through 
labor law, students can learn administrative law.  Moreover, labor law is vital to 
understanding how to deal with many workplaces, especially the public sector 
where unions represent a larger percentage of workers.250  Indeed, the NLRA 
protects all employees—union and nonunion—who are engaged in mutual aid or 
protection.   
A quick glance at recent federal labor case law and the September 2007 NLRB 
decisions might suggest that legal abstentionists have a point—at least to the extent 
that legal processes appear to have diluted, perhaps even repressed, Section 7 
rights. Unions, through their lobbying efforts in the political sphere, are responsible 
for most legislation that constitutes the floor of rights upon which our working 
class walks.  That includes health and safety regulations, minimum wage and 
                                                                                                     
 245. The facts under the case Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), provide insight into 
this approach.  In that case, the company, which had a history of racial segregation and open 
discrimination, began to require either a high school diploma or passage on two general intelligence 
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 247. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Making Globalization Work for Employees (July 22, 2009) (unpublished 
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available at http://www.icem.org/en/3-Energy-Oil-and-Gas/2724-North-American-Steelworkers-
UK%E2%80%99s-Unite-Forge-Trans-Atlantic-Union-Alliance.   
 249. For some discussion of this issue, see Cynthia Estlund, Reflections on the Declining Prestige of 
American Labor Law Scholarship, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y. J. 789 (2002).   
 250. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPS NO. 42, UNION AFFILIATION OF  EMPLOYED WAGE 
AND SALARY WORKERS BY OCCUPATION AND INDUSTRY (2008), available at 
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maximum hour laws, child safety laws, and hundreds of other government acts that 
prevent the exploitation of workers upon whose sweat—and sometimes blood—our 
society relies to enjoy a high standard of living.251  However, labor advocates must 
not surrender by entirely abandoning the courts and the NLRB.  While true 
liberation of workers might largely come through economic and political channels, 
labor advocates ignore the courts and administrative agencies at the peril of our 
workers and a more progressive social agenda. 
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